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William A. Galston
Published on Sunday, June 16, 2002 in the Washington
Post
As the White House moves closer to a brand-new security doctrine
that
supports preemptive attacks against hostile states or terrorists
that
have chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, Iraq would be first
on
its list of targets. The Bush administration has argued before that
the national security of the United States requires the elimination
of
Saddam Hussein's regime, by force if necessary. Democrats with
national ambitions have been lining up to agree.
A preemptive all-out invasion of Iraq would represent one of the
most
fateful deployments of American power since World War II. Given
the
stakes, the policy discussion in official Washington has been
remarkably narrow. To be sure, glib analogies between Iraq and
Afghanistan and cocky talk about a military "cakewalk"
have given way
to more sober assessments: A regime change would likely require
150,000-200,000 U.S. troops, allies in the region willing to allow
us to pre-position and supply them, and a post-victory occupation
measured in years rather than months.
But hardly anyone in either party is debating the long-term diplomatic
consequences of a move against Iraq that is opposed by many of our
staunchest friends. Fewer still have raised the most fundamental
point: A global strategy based on the new Bush doctrine means the
end
of the system of international institutions, laws and norms that
the
United States has worked for more than half a century to build.
What is at stake is nothing less than a fundamental shift in America's
place in the world. Rather than continuing to serve as first among
equals in the postwar international system, the United States would
act as a law unto itself, creating new rules of international
engagement without agreement by other nations. In my judgment, this
new stance would ill serve the long-term interests of our country.
I raise these doubts with the greatest reluctance, as a Democrat
who
believes that the global projection of American power has been,
in the
main, an enormous force for good. I strongly supported the Persian
Gulf War, and I helped draft a public statement rallying intellectuals
behind the Bush administration's initial response to the events
of
Sept. 11. I agree with the administration that the threat of stateless
terrorism requires a new, more forward-leaning response.
But an invasion of Iraq is a different matter altogether. We should
contain Hussein, deter him and bring him down the way we brought
down the Evil Empire that threatened our existence for half a century
--
through economic, diplomatic, military and moral pressure, not force
of arms.
On June 1, in a speech at West Point, President Bush sought to
justify
the new doctrine. The successful strategies of the Cold War era,
he
declared, are ill-suited to the requirements of national defense
in
the 21st century. Deterrence means nothing against terrorist networks;
containment will not thwart unbalanced dictators possessing weapons
of mass destruction. We cannot afford to wait until we are attacked,
he
declared. In today's circumstances, Americans must be ready for
"preemptive action" to defend our lives and liberties.
Applied to Iraq (although the president did not do so explicitly
in
his speech), the case for preemption runs roughly as follows: We
do
not know whether Hussein has yet acquired nuclear weapons or whether
he has transferred them to terrorists. It doesn't matter. We know
that he's trying to get these weapons, and his past conduct suggests
that he will use them against our interests.
The White House view goes on to say that the probability of the
worst case is low but hardly negligible. And that we must not be
held hostage to standards of proof better suited to courts of law
than to circumstances of war. And that we cannot wait until one
of Hussein's bombs, packed into a terrorist's suitcase, blows up
Manhattan or Washington. We must act now -- do whatever it takes
-- to eliminate this threat.
While the administration's arguments are powerful, they are less
than
persuasive. The proposed move against Iraq raises issues fundamentally
different from those posed by our response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait and to al Qaeda's attacks against New York and Washington.
In those cases our policy fitted squarely within established doctrines
of self-defense, and in part for that reason our deployment of military
power enjoyed widespread support around the world. By contrast,
if we seek to overthrow Hussein, we will act outside the framework
of global security that we have helped create.
In the first place, we are a signatory to (indeed, the principal
drafter of) the U.N. charter, which explicitly reserves to sovereign
nations "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,"
but only in the event of armed attack. Unless the administration
establishes
Iraqi complicity in the terrorism of Sept. 11, it cannot invoke
self-defense, as defined by the charter, as the justification for
attacking Iraq.
By contrast, in his speech justifying the April 1986 strike against
Libya, President Reagan was able to say that "the evidence
is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of La Belle discotheque
was planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime.
. . . Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is
the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight -- a mission fully
consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations charter."
If the Bush administration has comparable evidence against Iraq,
it has a responsibility to lay these facts before Congress, the
American people and the world.
The broader structure of international law creates additional obstacles
to an invasion of Iraq. To be sure, international law contains a
doctrine of "anticipatory self-defense." But even construed
broadly, that concept would still be too narrow to support an attack:
The threat to the United States from Iraq is neither specific nor
clearly established nor shown to be imminent. The Bush doctrine
of preemption goes well beyond the established bounds of anticipatory
self-defense, as many supporters of the administration's Iraq policy
privately concede. They argue that the United States needs to make
new law, using Iraq as a precedent.
But if the Bush administration wishes to discard the traditional
criterion of imminence on the grounds that terrorism renders it
obsolete, then the administration must do what it has thus far failed
to do -- namely, discharge the burden of showing that Iraq has both
the capability of harming us and a serious intent to do so. Otherwise,
"anticipatory self-defense" becomes an international hunting
license.
Finally, we can examine the proposed invasion through the prism
of
"just war" theories developed by philosophers and theologians
over a
period of centuries. One of just war's most distinguished contemporary
exponents, Michael Walzer, puts it this way: First strikes are justified
before the moment of imminent attack, at the point of "sufficient
threat." That concept has three dimensions: "a manifest
intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that
intent a positive danger and a general situation in which waiting,
or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk."
The potential injury, moreover, must be of the gravest possible
nature: the loss of territorial integrity or political independence.
Hussein may well endanger the survival of his neighbors, but he
poses
no such risk to the United States. And he knows full well that complicity
in a Sept. 11-style attack on the United States would justify, and
swiftly evoke, a regime-ending response. During the Gulf War, we
invoked this threat to deter him from using weapons of mass destruction
against our troops, and there is no reason to believe that this
strategy would be less effective today. Dictators have much more
to lose than do stateless terrorists; that's why deterrence directed
against them has a good chance of working.
It is not hard to imagine the impatience with which serious
policymakers inside the administration (and elsewhere) will greet
arguments such as mine. The first duty of every government, they
might
say, is to defend the lives and security of its citizens. The elimination
of Hussein and, by extension, every regime that threatens to share
weapons of mass destruction with anti-American terrorists, comports
with this duty. To invoke international norms designed for a different
world is to blind ourselves to the harsh necessities of international
action in the new era of terrorism. If no other nation agrees, we
have a duty to the American people to go it alone.
These are weighty claims, and it is not my intention to dismiss
them
entirely or lightly. But even if an invasion succeeds in removing
a threat here and now, it is far from clear that a policy of preemption
will make us safer in the long run. Nations cooperating with us
in the war against terror might respond to a preemptive U.S. attack
on Iraq by ceasing to arrest and turn over suspected terrorists,
and by halting the sharing of intelligence. Our allies in Europe
(and elsewhere) might respond by accelerating their diplomatic and
military separation from us. Our adversaries might well redouble
their efforts against us. New generations of young people -- including
those of our erstwhile allies -- could grow up resenting and resisting
America. One thing is certain:
If we promote and then act on our new principles, nations around
the
world will adopt them and shape them for their own purposes, with
consequences we will not always like.
We are the most powerful nation on Earth but we are not invulnerable.
To safeguard our own security, we need the help of the allies whose
doubts we scorn, and the protection of the international restraints
against which we chafe. We must therefore resist the easy seduction
of
unilateral action. In the long run, our interests will be best served
by an international system that is as law-like and collaborative
as possible, given the reality that we live in a world of sovereign
states.
William Galston is a professor at the University
of Maryland's School
of Public Affairs and director of the Institute for Philosophy and
Public Policy. From 1993 until 1995 he served as deputy assistant
to
President Clinton for domestic policy.
© 2002 The Washington Post Company
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