| William A. Galston
Published September 23, 2002 — The
American Prospect
On June 1 at West Point, President George W. Bush set forth a new
doctrine for U.S. security policy. The successful strategies of
the Cold War era, he declared, are ill suited to national defense
in the 21st century. Deterrence means nothing against terrorist
networks; containment will not thwart unbalanced dictators possessing
weapons of mass destruction. We cannot afford to wait until we are
attacked. In today's circumstances, Americans must be ready to take
"preemptive action" to defend our lives and liberties.
On Aug. 26, Vice President Dick Cheney forcefully applied this
new doctrine to Iraq. Saddam Hussein, he stated, is bolstering the
country's chemical and biological capabilities and is aggressively
pursuing nuclear weapons. "What we must not do in the face
of a mortal threat," he declared, "is to give in to wishful
thinking or willful blindness ... Deliverable weapons of mass destrction
in the hands of a terror network or murderous dictator or the two
working together constitutes as grave a threat as can be imagined.
The risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action."
After an ominous silence lasting much of the summer, a debate about
U.S. policy toward Iraq has finally begun. Remarkably, Democratic
elected officials are not party to it. Some agree with Bush administration
hawks; others have been intimidated into acquiescence or silence.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings yielded questions
rather than answers and failed to prod Democratic leaders into declaring
their position. Meanwhile, Democratic political consultants are
advising their clients to avoid foreign policy and to wage their
campaigns on the more hospitable turf of corporate fraud and prescription
drugs. The memory of the Gulf War a decade ago, when the vast majority
of Democrats ended up on the wrong side of the debate, deters many
from re-entering the fray today.
The Democratic Party's abdication has left the field to Republican
combatants -- unilateralists versus multilateralists, ideologues
versus "realists." The resulting debate has been intense
but narrow, focused primarily on issues of prudence rather than
principle.
This is not to suggest that the prudential issues are unimportant,
or that the intra-Republican discord has been less than illuminating.
Glib analogies between Iraq and Afghanistan and cocky talk about
a military cakewalk have given way to more sober assessments. President
Bush's oft-repeated goal of "regime change" would likely
require 150,000 to 200,000 U.S. troops, allies in the region willing
to allow us to pre-position and supply those forces and bloody street
battles in downtown Baghdad. With little left to lose, Saddam Hussein
might carry out a "Samson scenario" by equipping his Scud
missiles with chemical or biological agents and firing them at Tel
Aviv. Senior Israeli military and intelligence officials doubt that
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would defer to U.S. calls for
restraint, as Yitzhak Shamir's government did during the Gulf War.
Israeli retaliation could spark a wider regional conflagration.
Assume that we can surmount these difficulties. The Bush administration's
goal of regime change is the equivalent of our World War II aim
of unconditional surrender, and it would have similar postwar consequences.
We would assume total responsibility for Iraq's territorial integrity,
for the security and basic needs of its population, and for the
reconstruction of its system of governance and political culture.
This would require an occupation measured in years or even decades.
Whatever our intentions, nations in the region (and
elsewhere) would view our continuing presence through the historical
prism of colonialism. The Economist, which favors a U.S. invasion
of Iraq, nonetheless speaks of the "imperial flavour"
of such a potential occupation.
But the risks would not end there. The Bush administration and
its supporters argue that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would
shift the political balance in our favor throughout the Middle East
(including among the Palestinians). Henry Kissinger is not alone
in arguing that the road to solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
leads through Baghdad, not the other way around. More broadly, say
the optimists, governments in the region would see that opposing
the United States carries serious risk, and that there is more to
be gained from cooperating with us. Rather than rising up in injured
pride, the Arab "street" would respect our resolve and
move toward moderation, as would Arab leaders.
Perhaps so. But it does not take much imagination to conjure a
darker picture, and the performance of our intelligence services
in the region does not inspire confidence in the factual basis of
the optimists' views. If a wave of public anger helped Islamic radicals
unseat Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf, for example, we would
have exchanged a dangerous regime seeking nuclear weapons for an
even more dangerous regime that possesses them.
All this, and I have not yet mentioned potential economic and diplomatic
consequences. Even a relatively short war would likely produce an
oil-price spike that could tip the fragile global economy into recession.
Moreover, unlike the Gulf War, which the Japanese and Saudis largely
financed, the United States would have to go it alone this time,
with an estimated price tag of $60 billion for the war and $15 billion
to $20 billion per year for the occupation.
Our closest allies have spoken out against an invasion of Iraq.
Gerhard Schröder, leading a usually complaisant Germany but
locked in a tough re-election fight, has gone so far as to label
this possibility an "adventure," sparking a protest from
our ambassador. Some Bush administration officials seem not to believe
that our allies' views matter all that much. Others argue, more
temperately, that the Europeans and other protesters will swallow
their reservations after the fact, when they can see the military
success of our action and its positive consequences. They may be
right. But it is at least as likely that this disagreement will
widen the already sizeable gap between European and American worldviews.
Generations of young people could grow up resenting and resisting
America, as they did after the Vietnam War. Whether or not these
trends in the long run undermine our alliances, they could have
a range of negative short-term consequences, including diminished
intelligence sharing and cooperation.
Republicans have at least raised these prudential issues. For the
most part, however, they have ignored broader questions of principle.
But these questions cannot be evaded. An invasion of Iraq would
be one of the most fateful deployments of American power since World
War II. A global strategy based on the new Bush doctrine of preemption
means the end of the system of international institutions, laws
and norms that we have worked to build for more than half a century.
To his credit, Kissinger recognizes this; he labels Bush's new approach
"revolutionary" and declares, "Regime change as a
goal for military intervention challenges the international system."
The question is whether this revolution in international doctrine
is justified and wise.
I think not. What is at stake is nothing less than a fundamental
shift in America's place in the world. Rather than continuing to
serve as first among equals in the postwar international system,
the United States would act as a law unto itself, creating new rules
of international engagement without the consent of other nations.
In my judgment, this new stance would ill serve the long-term interests
of the United States.
There is a reason why President Bush could build on the world's
sympathy in framing the U.S. response to al-Qaeda after September
11, and why his father was able to sustain such a broad coalition
to reverse Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. In those cases our
policy fit squarely within established doctrines of self-defense.
By contrast, if we seek to overthrow Saddam Hussein, we will act
outside the framework of global security that we have helped create.
In the first place, we are a signatory to (indeed, the principal
drafter of) the United Nations Charter, which explicitly reserves
to sovereign nations "the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense," but only in the event of armed attack. Unless
the administration establishes Iraqi complicity in the terrorism
of 9-11, it cannot invoke self-defense, as defined by the charter,
as the justification for attacking Iraq. And if evidence of Iraqi
involvement exists, the administration has a responsibility to present
it to Congress, the American people and the world, much as John
F. Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson did to justify the U.S. naval blockade
of Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.
The broader structure of international law creates additional obstacles
to an invasion of Iraq. To be sure, such law contains a doctrine
of "anticipatory self-defense," and there is an ongoing
argument concerning its scope. Daniel Webster, then secretary of
state, offered the single most influential statement of the doctrine
in 1837: There must be shown "a necessity of self-defense ...
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." Some contemporary scholars adopt a more
permissive view. But even if that debate were resolved in the manner
most favorable to the Bush administration, the concept of anticipatory
self-defense would still be too narrow to support an attack on Iraq:
The threat to the United States from Iraq is not sufficiently specific,
clearly enough established or shown to be imminent.
The Bush doctrine of preemption goes well beyond the established
bounds of anticipatory self-defense, as many supporters of the administration's
Iraq policy privately concede. (They argue that the United States
needs to make new law, using Iraq as a precedent.) If the administration
wishes to argue that terrorism renders the imminence criterion obsolete,
it must do what it has thus far failed to do -- namely, to show
that Iraq has both the capability of harming us and a serious intent
to do so. The abstract logical possibility that Saddam Hussein could
transfer weapons of mass destruction to stateless terrorists is
not enough. If we cannot make our case, the world will see anticipatory
self-defense as an international hunting license.
Finally, we can examine the proposed invasion of Iraq through the
prism of just war theories developed by philosophers and theologians
over a period of centuries. One of its most distinguished contemporary
exponents, Michael Walzer, puts it this way: First strikes can occasionally
be justified before the moment of imminent attack, if we have reached
the point of "sufficient threat." This concept has three
dimensions: "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active
preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general
situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting,
greatly magnifies the risk." The potential injury, moreover,
must be of the gravest possible nature: the loss of territorial
integrity or political independence.
Saddam Hussein may well endanger the survival of his neighbors,
but he poses no such risk to the United States. And he knows full
well that complicity in a 9-11-style terrorist attack on the United
States would justify, and swiftly evoke, a regime-ending response.
During the Gulf War, we invoked this threat to deter him from using
weapons of mass destruction against our troops, and there is no
reason to believe that this strategy would be less effective today.
Dictators have much more to lose than do stateless terrorists; that's
why deterrence directed against them has a good chance of working.
In its segue from al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein, and from defense
to preemption, the Bush administration has shifted its focus from
stateless foes to state-based adversaries, and from terrorism in
the precise sense to the possession of weapons of mass destruction.
Each constitutes a threat. But they are not the same threat and
do not warrant the same response. It serves no useful purpose to
pretend that they are seamlessly connected, let alone one and the
same.
The United Nations, international law, just-war theory -- it is
not hard to imagine the impatience with which policy makers will
greet arguments made on these bases. The first duty of every government,
they will say, is to defend the lives and security of its citizens.
The elimination of Saddam Hussein and, by extension, every regime
that threatens to share weapons of mass destruction with anti-American
terrorists, comports with this duty. To invoke international norms
designed for a different world is to blind ourselves to the harsh
necessities of international action in this new era of terrorism.
Now that we have faced the facts about the axis of evil, it would
be a dereliction of duty to shrink from their consequences for policy.
Even if no other nation agrees, we have a duty to the American people
to go it alone. The end justifies -- indeed requires -- the means.
These are powerful claims, not easily dismissed. But even if an
invasion of Iraq succeeds in removing a threat here and now, it
is not clear whether a policy of preemption would make us safer
in the long run. Specifically, we must ask how the new norms of
international action we employ would play out as nations around
the world adopt them and shape them to their own purposes. (And
they will; witness the instant appropriation of the United States'
antiterrorism rhetoric by Russia and India, among others.) It is
an illusion to believe that the United States can employ new norms
of action while denying the rights of others to do so as well.
Also at stake are competing understandings of the international
system and of our role within it. Some administration officials
appear to believe that alliances and treaties are in the main counterproductive,
constraining us from most effectively pursuing our national interest.
Because the United States enjoys unprecedented military, economic
and technological preeminence, we can do best by going it alone.
The response to these unilateralists is that that there are many
goals that we cannot hope to achieve without the cooperation of
others. To pretend otherwise is to exchange short-term gains for
long-term risks.
Even after we acknowledge the important distinctions between domestic
and international politics, the fact remains: No push for international
cooperation can succeed without international law and, therefore,
without treaties that build the institutions for administering that
law. This is one more reason, if one were needed, why the United
States must resist the temptation to set itself apart from the system
of international law. It will serve us poorly in the long run if
we offer public justifications for an invasion of Iraq that we cannot
square with established international legal norms.
We are the most powerful nation on earth, but we must remember
we are not invulnerable. To safeguard our own security, we need
the assistance of the allies whose doubts we scorn, and the protection
of the international restraints against which we chafe. We must
therefore resist the easy seduction of unilateral action. In the
long run, our interests will best be served by an international
system that is as lawlike and collaborative as possible, given the
reality that we live in a world of sovereign states.
William Galston is a professor at the University
of Maryland's School
of Public Affairs and director of the Institute for Philosophy and
Public Policy. From 1993 until 1995 he served as deputy assistant
to
President Clinton for domestic policy.
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