INTERNATIONAL ROUNDTABLE REPORT

The Theory and Practice of Civic Globalism

A Program of the Democracy Collaborative

April 19-21, 2001

Washington, D.C.

THE INTERNATIONAL ROUNDTABLE REPORT

The International Roundtable on the Theory and Practice of Civic Globalism was held at the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center in Washington, D.C., from April 19 to 21, 2001. Sponsored by the Democracy Collaborative of the University of Maryland, the meeting brought together leaders from academe, international agencies, civil society organizations, and the corporate sector from 12 countries. The Roundtable was the first part of an ongoing discussion aimed at creating new strategies for strengthening democracy worldwide.

The meeting began with an introductory briefing and dinner at the South African Embassy. Following was a day and a half of intensive discussion about the progress of democracy in the post-Cold War, post-communist period, the major obstacles to its development, and strategies for addressing them.

The report is an edited version of the Roundtable proceedings. For additional copies, please contact the Democracy Collaborative office at the University of Maryland. See back cover for coordinates.

The next meeting of the International Roundtable will take place in June 2002 at the American Academy in Berlin. The conversation will resume with due consideration of the terrorist attacks on the United States that took place on September 11, 2001, and their significance in the effort to globalize democracy.

Sondra Myers
Editor

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Roundtable, *The Theory and Practice of Civic Globalism*, focused on five areas of a very expansive topic in order to set limits and give coherence to its deliberations. Its knowledgeable and articulate participants, exercising considerable discipline and restraint, succeeded in working through its full agenda. Following is a brief summary of the discussions.

Session One: Measuring Global Civic Trends Over the past 15 years there has been an unprecedented increase in civil society organizations in every part of the world. The nature of the organizations differs widely, as does their effectiveness. In some societies they are a conservative force, in others a force for social progress. In some they are cooperative with government, in others they represent the loyal or disloyal opposition. Current civil society assessment initiatives were discussed, including CIVICUS' Civil Society Index. However, there is little consensus about ideal indicators or even the direction in which they point. A critical factor in the success of the organizations is the degree to which they are accepted and supported by their governments.

Session Two: Technology and Global Civil Society The revolutionary advance in telecommunications has had dramatic implications for the free flow of information and can be a major force in fostering civic globalism. However, the benefits of the advance—access to the Internet and even to traditional sources of information (radio, television, and print media)—are unavailable to a substantial percentage of the world's population. In addition there is concern that the commercialization of the media can result in cultural hegemony and homogenization that are detrimental to the evolution of democracy. Technology often mirrors the dominant focus of a society and, without a strong political will, cannot be expected to transform it.

Session Three: The Arts as the Unacknowledged Keystone of Civil Society This session, held in the Clarice Smith Center for the Performing Arts at the University of Maryland, featured live dance, music, and theater performances, commentary on the works performed, and a post-performance discussion on the central importance of the arts to a democratic society. There was consensus that the arts are essential for their spirit of innovation and creativity and for their ability to express the full range of human expression and vision; above all, for their evocation of imagination—a key feature of both democracy and the arts.

Session Four: Global Civil Society vs. Global Markets and *Session Five: Global Civil Society and Global Governance* were held jointly. The discussion focused on the challenges posed by globalized markets and the difficulty in creating a meaningful international approach to governance and cooperation. The global market reinforces and seems to widen the gap between haves and have-nots, and creates anxiety and despair in poorer nations. It is important to work toward mutually beneficial relationships between rich and poor, north and south, etc.; each has something valuable to offer the other. As for global governance, there is reluctance on the part of the powerful nations, and, in particular, the United States, to acknowledge the realities of interdependence and act cooperatively. Building strength on interdependence of the various sectors within a society—government, business, and civil society—and among nations is essential for the sustainability of democracy. There is an asymmetry in globalization, which calls for a more robust effort to redress its detrimental effects on the poor and use its strengths to build the infrastructure of a global democratic community.

In closing, participants concurred that the globalization of democracy is necessary to "contain" the globalized market, to address the global problems of disease, poverty, corruption, and terrorism, and to afford to all the world's people access to freedom and social justice.

OPENING REMARKS

Benjamin Barber: Because all of us have had long and extensive experience in the area of civil society and democracy and many of you have come a long distance to meet, we did not ask for the preparation of formal papers. It is our intention that this meeting provide maximum time for full participation in the exchange of ideas on the somewhat daunting challenges of strengthening democracy and civil society worldwide.

The extended agenda has a session-by-session outline with a set of suggested questions and resource people who will help to set each session in motion. Obviously, the questions in the agenda are merely suggestions; please feel free to ask others. And do speak freely and openly; this conversation will only be productive if we are willing to do so. We hope and trust that the tone of these meetings will allow both vigorous dissent and civility and respect.

The five topics are, to some degree, arbitrary. We could have talked about many others—the environment, arms, health, AIDS, development assistance, or education; those are all meaningful and vital themes for global civil society. No doubt some of them will find their way into the discussion and will certainly appear in future ones.

We will start our discussion with a somewhat technical debate on what it is we mean by global civil society and democracy and how philosophers, social scientists, and activists go about defining and understanding those terms. There are a number of people in this room who have spent a good deal of time thinking about what these terms mean, particularly transnationally, because when you go outside a particular social and national culture, the question of definition becomes compounded. When we move across cultures, we find the common currency is less common than we thought.

It is important to our deliberations that we get on the table some of the implications of the differences in our understandings of democracy and civil society. My own view is that the term "democracy" might better be replaced by the term "democracies," and the term "civil society" might better be replaced by the term "forms and variations of civil society," culturally, nationally, and historically differentiated. I suspect that the insistence on the singular is part of our problem. I needn't tell the people around this table that there are as many roads to democracy and understandings of democracy as there are histories of national and civic cultures; and that though sometimes the more powerful among us—like the nation of which I am a citizen—think that their experience is paradigmatic for people everywhere, democracy has not only many definitions, but many histories and many roots. It has appeared in many different places, not simply as a result of the influence of England or France or the United States, but in its own indigenous forms. Nonetheless, if we are to talk to one another productively, we need to ask some questions: Are there core meanings? Is there a common language that we can use to discuss our differences? Let's begin our expedition by exploring those definitional and semantic issues.

SESSION ONE

Measuring Global Civic Trends

Defining terms is critical to a discussion of measurement. Are there definitions that “hold” across national boundaries? Is civil society a meaningful term in all cultures? Is democracy a “loaded” or “unloaded” term? Comparative surveys across nations, along with “international” surveys, have traditionally presented problems for social scientists. Comparing incommensurable data from culturally and historically distinctive societies is always problematic. Finding empirical indicators for essentially normative constructs such as democracy, citizen competence, and social capital is difficult. Determining whether “international” denotes merely transnational, non-national, or some more positive set of characteristics (“global” as in global markets) is subject to controversy.

In this session we will confront the challenges of defining and measuring civil society, relying for leadership on scholars who have been engaged in cross-polity and international analysis. Among the questions we may want to pose:

1. Are there plausible cross-polity indicators for “democracy” or “civil society” that allow meaningful comparison, or are country and cultural differences such that our allegedly objective indicators can only distort reality or impress one nation’s experiences and values on another?
2. Do measures of democracy and civil society reflect an American bias arising out of American historical and moral assumptions and American social science methodology? How can such biases be avoided?
3. Is it useful to speak of “democracy” or “civil society” generically (in the way some call “essentialist”), or would it be more useful to use the plural form—“democracies” and “forms of civil society”—to reflect the heterogeneous and historically varied experience of many different nations and cultures?
4. Even within American social science there are variable meanings and theories of both democracy (for example, “representative democracy,” “strong democracy,” “deliberative democracy,” and “plebiscitary democracy”) and “civil society,” which is often used as a synonym for the nonprofit sector. Can we agree on common meanings to measure, when these varying definitions are so theoretically and politically controversial?

Session Resources: Karatnycky, Hodgkinson, McCarthy, Naidoo, Salamon

Lester Salamon: My fundamental premise in doing comparative work is that one has to start with some common understanding in order to see differences. Our work, which has been going on for 10 years, involves about 200 researchers in some 30 countries around the world. Its intent has been to try to describe, explain, and evaluate a particular set of social institutions. We've used various terms to describe these institutions, among them, the non-profit sector, the voluntary sector, and the civil society sector. I'm not so concerned about the terminology used as about the notion that there is a common core definition, which we came to as a group after some two-and-a-half years of work.

Essentially we have defined this set of institutions as having five basic characteristics:

1. They are organizations in the sociological sense of the word, whether formal or informal; that is, they have some structure, some pattern, and some commonality of activity over time.
2. They are in the private sector, not part of the apparatus of government.
3. They are entities that do not distribute profits to their owners or directors. Though they may earn profits, they are not profit-distributing.
4. They are self-governing with their own internal mechanisms for self-government.
5. They are voluntary in the sense of not being compulsory. Membership is not a condition of citizenship, it is a matter of choice.

Beginning with that definition, we have attempted to describe and portray a set of widely diverse entities in all parts of the world and to understand their scope, scale, and character. We have also attempted to explain the very dramatic differences that exist from place to place in terms of their overall scale, their composition, their funding sources, and the role they play in their societies. And we have tried to assess the consequences of their being there or not being there—their impact. We have developed a whole set of criteria against which to assess the impact these organizations have.

Very briefly, we have found that contrary to the specter of the lonely bowler[1] that's currently haunting the world, we are in the midst of something very dramatic—a global associational revolution, a fairly massive upsurge of organized, private, voluntary action around the world.

Second, we find that there are demand and supply explanations for this upsurge. The demand explanations have to do with the disillusionment with the capacity of the state on its own to solve problems that we thought it was quite capable of solving, e.g. social welfare, environmental problems, development problems, etc. And supply factors include the growth of a strikingly educated middle class in many parts of the world where such elements did not exist before—they are the "shock troops" of the civil society revolution. Also on the supply side we have telecommunications, which has made organizations easier to create, and outside financial assistance that has allowed these organizations to develop significantly.

So the first point is that we're in the middle of a global revolution. The second point is that it's not an accident. As a result, we're living in the midst of an immense "social forest"—a massive, nonprofit or civil society sector, a set of institutions and organizations, both formal and informal, some of them legal and some of them illegal, which have become a massive economic force in the world. In our work in 27 countries, we've identified a sector that has some 19 million full-time-equivalent paid employees—and about 5% of the labor force. One out of every 20

1. Robert D. Putnam. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy*, 6:1, Jan. 1995.

paid workers in the world is employed in this sector. There are another 11 million full-time-equivalent volunteers working in these organizations; that's another 2.5% of the labor force. In the early 1990s the sector was growing three times faster than the economies of which it is a part.

Third, the growth is not by any means an American phenomenon. It turns out that the sector is much more developed in many other parts of the world, Western Europe in particular. Four of the 27 countries we looked at have nonprofit sectors that are larger, even measured in terms of employment, than in the U.S.: they are the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and Israel.

The fourth point is that the growth of this sector is not simply a product of philanthropy and charity. Philanthropy and charity are about 10% of its revenue base. Government as a source of income is about 42%, which means that our traditional notion of these two sectors as at war with each other needs modification. The sector grows most rapidly and effectively where there is a partnership with government. And the countries with the largest nonprofit sectors are those where the partnership is most well-established, where the nonprofit sector has co-opted the government as its funding agent. The Netherlands would be a classic example of that. That is not to say that there aren't elements of conflict in the situation; but *modi vivendi* have been worked out.

The fifth and final point is that, for all its strength, the sector is still a fragile ecosystem. It has elements of strength and amazing durability and economic power; nevertheless, it suffers from a variety of challenges. There are challenges of legitimacy—the legal structures in most parts of the world still are not particularly favorable to these organizations. There are increasing challenges of effectiveness; the sector is being called on to do some things it's not capable of doing without a great deal of investment, and the investment hasn't been there. There are challenges of sustainability, particularly as its major funding source—which in many places has been government—has encountered difficulties. There's been a flurry of activity to figure out how to sustain the sector in the long run. The most rapidly growing source of income seems to be commercial, such as fees and charges for service. And then there is the continuing challenge of collaboration. These organizations take pride in their independence and have difficulty collaborating within the sector as well as with government and business.

Finally, I believe that the organizational dimension of citizen participation in political life is fundamental in a civil society.

Kumi Naidoo: I will address this from the perspective of the work of CIVICUS in general, but also specifically of the work that we have been doing over the last two years to develop the Global Civil Society Index Project. I raise three broad questions: "What are we measuring?" "Why measure?" And "How?"

There is a tendency in both the policy and practitioner worlds to speak about civil society in a very homogeneous sense. It's important to recognize its diversity. World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn laments that the more he tries to reach out to civil society, the more its representatives criticize and attack the Bank. Clearly he is reaching out to a very narrow stratum of civil society, and the failure to recognize its heterogeneity leads to major intellectual and practical problems.

It's also important to recognize that in many parts of the world the concept of civil society is very new. Coming from Africa into my position at CIVICUS, civil society was a very new concept for us. I had the sense that civil society was largely a progressive

notion—of common citizen action for the progressive common good. I was completely shocked when I addressed one of my first meetings in the southern part of the United States when an African American member of the audience said, "How can you be involved in the anti-apartheid movement and support civil society? Where I come from, the Ku Klux Klan is part of civil society. It's non-governmental, nonprofit, membership-based, internally democratic (in its own way), and members work passionately on a voluntary basis to advance the mission of the organization." In our attempts at assessment and measurement, we need to think about the "un-civil" civil society. Still, the concept of civil society is now widely accepted, although used differently in different places. CIVICUS and other organizations won the battle of introducing the concept of civil society into the public vocabulary. Now we are concerned that it might mean all things to all people.

Regarding the second question, "Why measure?," in consultations we did in the Global Civil Society Index Project, we got a whole range of very interesting responses from practitioners in the field. On the practitioners' side, there are some real questions about what drives the urge for measurement. How much of it is simply out of curiosity? How much is to inform and affect policy in a substantive way? How does measurement and assessment advance the various causes that civil society is seeking to promote? In Egypt, for example, people in the human rights sector were concerned that their work could reveal certain information that repressive states would manipulate. This is the kind of dilemma on the practitioners' side that we have to consider.

The third question is concerned with how we measure. Early in our consultations on the Index, we were alerted to a quotation by Albert Einstein, "Not everything that counts can be measured, and not everything that can be measured counts." The four dimensions we decided to measure are: the structure of civil society, the legal space within which civil society operates, the values that civil society promotes, and the impact that civil society organizations have in policy-making and policy-monitoring and in the provision of direct services. We are still having difficulty deciding which indicators to choose in each of those four dimensions. The easiest indicators are not necessarily the most useful.

Coming back to the cultural-relativity question, in the early stages of the process we chose as an indicator the question, "Is the taxation of vitamins enabling to the promotion of civil society?" I thought that was a straightforward query and one of the indicators that we'd use in every country. When I presented this tax question to a focus group in Pakistan last fall, everybody burst out laughing. In Pakistan only about 7% of the people pay taxes to begin with, so that indicator had no resonance at all with them. Since we want the Index to have a direct enabling and empowering impact on the sector, we recognize that choosing indicators is a challenging task.

Let me conclude with this comment. I believe that a strong collaborative relationship between practitioners and the academic community would enhance the quality of the intellectual work within the academy and at the same time have significant social impact. I pose that as a friendly challenge to our friends in the academic world.

Benjamin Barber: Your challenge comes very close to defining what those of us who are creating the Democracy Collaborative understand to be its mission: to create a space between the academy and the world of practice where people on both sides can work together productively.

Virginia Hodgkinson: I was a non-academic for 23 years and re-joined the university a few years ago. I am also president of the International Society for Third-Sector Research, which has researchers as members in 81 nations. One of their major questions is, "What is the third sector and what is its relationship to civil society?"

I am impressed by the fact that we in the United States know very little about the kinds of democracies we have in our own country. We know very little about the impact of associations on public policy. I started looking at literature around the world. There are two very fine audits: one in Sweden that has been going on for about 10 years and one in Great Britain. The Swedish audit brings us to our central question today. It has two interests: studying its own democracy to see if it's working; and understanding citizenship in a global community. Many of us are dealing with these issues. You are a citizen of a nation-state: What does that mean with regard to larger global issues? What does your vote mean? What does your participation mean? Is the nation-state eroding? Who's governing the world? There are a lot of articles out now on the power shift. Some say that we have medieval coalitions running the world; others say that there is going to be collaboration among different sectors of society across the world.

I would like to list five of the questions that have now led to a Europe-wide study of citizen participation.

1. Is democracy only possible in the nation-state?
2. Is the nation-state disappearing?
3. Is multi-level democracy possible—running from the local community to the region to the county to the nation to the European parliament to the UN to what they call the world beyond Europe?
4. Is democracy suffering from a crisis of confidence?
5. Where is the democratic deficit to be found?

We in the Democracy Collaborative believe that these questions are crucially important. We need to have an understanding of democracy *within* nations before we can look *across* nations at various democracies and their governance.

In the 1997 Swedish audit, responses to the question "Where is the democratic deficit to be found?" revealed that the strongest representation was at the local level and that of the state parliament, next came the European Union (and not the European Parliament), with the lowest level being the UN and other organizations beyond national borders. In short, the audit shows that one can be a local citizen in a local town in Sweden, having some concept of a Swedish government, but have very little concept of being a European citizen. This is important for all of us as we begin to think globally. On the other hand, when people think of voluntary associations, they can think more globally, because many associations work across borders; and people are very aware that they're not governments. So I leave this series of questions with you today as we determine where we go from here, how we begin to measure, and why we measure.

Kathleen McCarthy: I've looked at issues of philanthropy and civil society both as a historian and from a contemporary perspective. One of the key issues in all of this is what is transferable from society to society, and how the focus shifts when you try to look at the same factors in different societies. My own work has looked at the history of the rise of

civil society from the standpoint of the United States.

There are a lot of definitions of civil society, but I would argue that the one common denominator in all of them is that they are associations. And we've defined philanthropy as both giving and voluntarism, which means that it brings in social advocacy as well as the development of service-delivery organizations. It's about what private citizens can do with donations of their time and money in creating institutions and shaping public policy. Within that framework, we have looked at the factors that have encouraged or prevented people from participating in these activities. We used to think of the nonprofit sector as one of three discrete sectors: government, the market, and the nonprofit sector. As you've heard from some of the previous comments, that's changed dramatically over the last 15 years. We now realize that the sectors are linked. My research has focused on the blurring of the boundaries and what that means for what various groups are able to achieve in their societies.

Specifically, we see three kinds of activity: participation in social advocacy; involvement in service delivery in tandem with government; and market activities, the way in which organizations serve as magnets for funds for local investment. One of the findings that has come out of this—and this goes to Kumi's point—is that there is not one civil society; there are many civil societies, and different groups have historically used these activities in different ways. Second, when you talk about democracy in the United States, it is not a straight line; it fluctuates. Even at the time that Tocqueville was writing, the right to social advocacy was under attack by President Andrew Jackson's administration to the extent of engaging in First Amendment violations. The First Amendment is really the basis of our civil society; it's what gives us freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom to petition government for redress of grievances. How does that framework transfer to other countries? What can we learn when we start asking questions about how different groups engage in creating institutions that enable them to deliver services or participate in policy-making? We commissioned researchers in over 20 countries to look at the history of women and philanthropy, in part because we wanted to look at those who are often politically and economically disadvantaged in creating a space for institutional development and social advocacy. One of the interesting debates that have surfaced in scholarly research over the last few years is whether or not religious institutions should be included in what we think of as the nonprofit sector. What came out of this research is that religion is absolutely central to the role that women were able to play in different societies in creating these institutions.

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– Kathleen McCarthy

With regard to the scholar-practitioner divide, I will be a bit provocative here and say that I think it's a false issue. We have an international fellows program, with fellows from over 26 countries looking at community foundations. From the U.S. side there is great interest in disseminating the community foundation idea because so many non-governmental organizations have emerged in the last 20 to 30 years, there is concern about insuring their long-

term sustainability. Community foundations seem to offer a fairly replicable model for this. In the United States they were developed as mechanisms for providing flexibility and gaining endowments from different kinds of donors within the community. Internationally there is a different focus. There are market issues that we haven't thought of in this country in terms of long-term sustainability: How do you develop an endowment in a country where the banking system doesn't work, or where you can't invest for interest? Obviously, there are legal problems as well. How do you develop a legal framework that will allow you to sustain these things? The key issue that has come from the fellows from the post-communist societies is not how you use these entities to build endowment, but how to build transparency and trust; how you build institutions that will get people to believe that if you invest your time and money in nonprofit organizations they will pull in different groups for decision-making within their communities. They are also looking at diaspora philanthropy as a way of building endowments from expatriot groups, and they have found that some of the most effective diaspora philanthropy efforts right now stem from religious groups; one example is the Armenian Orthodox Church. We need to ask where religion fits into this mix, what we put into our definitions of civil society and what we leave out, and what are the key factors beyond definition and measurement that we need to take into consideration.

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— Kathleen McCarthy

Adrian Karatnycky: I'd like to return to Kumi's point of heterogeneity, but expand it to other heterogeneities involving civil societies and the interface with democratic practice. It is right to say that there is a rise in civil society, but there are many vectors of that civil society that are offsetting and cross -cutting, and there is no specific vector in the direction of "progressive" change. Sometimes I think that progressive change is often about discarding bad ideas and bad new notions, so progress may well come from conservative forces and conservative input.

Second, we need to look at the role of civil society in pre-democratic settings as compared and contrasted to the role in the more settled democracies. We find in our surveys of political rights and civil liberties that those societies that have organized alternative structures in opposition to the state have developed a very strong force for successful democratic practice and transparency.

My final point is about the issue of global structures and global civil society. Many causes have transnational solutions and therefore attract a transnational movement—an activism aimed at shaping and creating new institutions and pressuring them to perform—everything from the International Criminal Court to the Kyoto Treaty. There is also a countervailing current—institutions that have a locus within the nation-state and invest a higher degree of value in the democratic accountability of that nation-state. These groups are all part of the larger civil society. Some are concerned with the way the world is organized, about global issues, while others may be opposed to the political trends toward super-national structures. All these things should be a part of this discourse.

Jin Canrong: The term "civil society" is quite fresh to most Chinese intellectuals. It was introduced to

China in the late '80s and early '90s and relates to the collapse of the Soviet bloc, as it was perceived that civil society had a role in its collapse. The term "NGO" is even newer. People in China first learned of the existence of NGOs when the Women's World Forum was held in Beijing; it was quite a sensational issue for the average Chinese, particularly the average Chinese woman. There is no equivalent to civil society in our tradition. A traditional Chinese social association is mainly based on blood ties; we have no social association beyond that based on contract. It is a serious challenge for the future in China to establish a healthy civil society. I think that a healthy civil society is a pre-condition for the emergence of democracy.

Hong-Myong Kim: In Korea we have a "token" concept of civil society. While we might pride ourselves in having some form of civil society, we define civil society in terms of the propertied classes. I believe that it was government that created civil society to protect and promote it since the liberation of Korea in 1945. Civil society has entered the parlance of political power, but the power of government has not been changed. Civil society was sort of an appendage to political power in Korea in the past.

A few years back there was a political transfer from the government party to the opposition party, and with the rise of the present regime came a radical tension and even a contradiction between political power and civil society. Whereas the political power tried to transform society into a more democratic and liberated mode, civil society represented the interest of the establishment. With a new mood reflected in the moves of the South toward rapprochement with the North and President George W. Bush's policies toward the Far East, our former establishment civil society groups are likely to raise their voices against various policies launched by the present government.

Civil society hasn't developed an autonomous identity; it continues to exhibit its strength and influence within political realms in political language rather than in its own voice. I think our civil society movement is in a very early stage. But all of a sudden we had a kind of globalization in Korea. We have groups that represent international corporate interests as well as cosmopolitan cultures. This has had both positive and negative impact. It has been promoted by the present government, but the present government has been inhibited by the failure of economic policies and economic distress. We cannot be sure whether the idea of global civil society will be accepted in Korea. It depends on how the economic situation turns out.

It is a serious challenge for the future in China to establish a healthy civil society. I think that a healthy civil society is a pre-condition for the emergence of democracy.

— Jin Canrong

Benjamin Barber: There is a tendency, particularly among Americans, to think that civil society is a purely progressive notion. In fact, even in the United States it has a conservative cast. Historically, the state represented a more progressive force than civil society, which was attached to property. We don't want to make the mistake of thinking that civil society is inevitably and ineluctably a progressive notion. Some people would even say that it's progressivism that undermines and destroys civil society—the family, religion, and the cultures of local association.

Jesus Estanislao: The civil society movement in the Philippines has been influenced by a commitment

to democracy. Groups operate in the Philippines at various levels with very different ideologies and backgrounds and orientations. But in three instances these groups coalesced for what they consider a common objective—to save the country, to fight for democracy, to restore certain institutions that they believed in. However, there is always a need, at least in our experience, for an organizational backbone. That would be provided by three institutions of long standing: the Church, the military, and the press. The business community always moves where their own interests are.

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>
> —Hong-Myong Kim

Over the past 15 years, two groups have proven to be very significant. The first is the young people with their ideals. Many of their groups are committed to solving the crisis in our country. And second in importance to democracy is the middle class. The poor, many as they are, do not have the education and the background to commit themselves to common-good issues. But the moment there is a certain level of education and a certain level of income and a middle class emerges, you can give force to the things you would like to do in society.

Silvia Rueda de Uranga: I am president of Conciencia. When we started in Argentina in 1982, we were "selling" democracy as if it were Avon—house-to-house, and teaching about it. Now NGOs and civil society are growing in Argentina, because they are voluntary and because they provide employment. Latin American businesses have gone down because of the lack of education and infrastructure and because of our very high taxes.

We have been working with young people and with the middle class in the public schools, and we find that teachers and professors have two problems. They have to face pupils who come with all of the technology, and they are having a very difficult time answering their questions. The teachers tell the pupils to do what they want them to do, without thinking of what the young people need. Universities are doing research on this problem and studying the way the state needs to spend money to address it. We try to teach the citizens of Argentina to think globally and act locally.

Andrei Gratchev: Once we dare to introduce the notion of *global* civil society, we are invited to be both courageous and modest. Courageous, because we shouldn't be afraid to break rules and stereotypes and even change definitions. We are entering into the unknown sphere of globalism where previous definitions, especially those that have evolved within the context of Western democracy, can and should be questioned. Modest because the people here come from seven different time zones. But how many "democracy zones" do we represent? Many more. From that point of view, we cannot escape the singular-plural dialectic when we discuss democracy or civil society, or even the definition of what historic time we live in.

I don't believe there is a singular, unique historic time that is proper for all the established societies across this world. We all have different starting points, different calendars.

At present, Vladimir Putin, the new post-communist president, has a very intriguing notion of "guided democracy." But guided by whom? All this raises the question of the specificity of the terminology we use for societies in transition.

We need to ask: Is progress on the road of democracy reversible? Can't it retreat? Can't institutions, even

democratic institutions, elected structures, conceal the practices of autocracy? Sometimes institutions like the Church are elements of a new subordination of society in a more concealed, and therefore, a more efficient manner. Another question is: What do we do when we face the crisis of confidence in democracy, which is largely the case in Russia?

Jonathan Taplin: Three years ago, with nobody looking, the big energy companies of Texas managed to put through a bill deregulating energy in California. Citizens were completely unaware of what the effect of the deregulation would be, only to find ourselves faced with a rash of blackouts and energy bills that have gone up 140% in the last two months. We find ourselves in an infrastructure crisis. What role is civil society playing in dealing with any of these issues, or bringing them to the point, in this very advanced democracy, of organizing citizens against the subversion of democracy by corporate power?

Shibley Telhami: It's important to differentiate between the impact of global trends on the proliferation and impact of civil society *within* nations and, on the other hand, of a *global* civil society that is increasingly homogenized, with strong ties among different civil societies across borders. In the Middle East, relating to Dr. Salamon's observations, one can argue that telecommunications is a new factor that certainly increases the chance of linkages and makes it more possible to have NGOs. With regard to the supply and demand side, however, and resonating with what Mr. Gratchev said, I think it's a cyclical thing. Most of the increase is related to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire. If you look at trends both prior to and after World War II, particularly in parts of the third world, there has been a rise of nationalism—which was often authoritarian—and a significant decline of NGOs. Certainly that is true in countries of the Middle East. I would argue that civil society is by and large working class. The middle class might account for linkages across borders—the rise of a global civil society—because they are the ones that tend to be more Western-oriented than others. But in the Middle East there has always been a huge number of NGOs, a very vibrant civil society, that is typically ignored because it's mostly Islamist. Islamic groups are incredibly well organized. They provide services that states do not provide at all, including schooling and, sometimes, housing and employment.

> *What do we do when we face the crisis of confidence in democracy, which is largely the case in Russia?*
>
> —Andrei Gratchev

A trend that is often talked about is the emergence of an elite middle class—a Western-oriented civil society with increasing links across borders. *That* civil society is at odds with the larger civil society in some countries, and in fact finds itself facing two huge barriers. One is the continued perception, as is the case in Korea and elsewhere, that those who have Western ties and are linked to global civil society do not reflect a progressive, contemporary trend but rather are a function of American and Western hegemony. That civil society is seen as an instrument of Western imperialism and is delegitimized. Since the state rejects it, its impact on society is considerably lessened by virtue of its being linked across boundaries. At home people want to see democracy and transparency; they want their governments to open up, but they are so fearful of NGOs like the Islamist groups, they end up defending the government. There is a sense of paralysis that mostly favors the local NGOs that are not globally linked. Still I would argue that there is not a discernable trend toward civil society, either

within nations or globally, particularly in the Middle East.

Franklin Sonn: We often define concepts like democracy and civil society in a G-8 way, and they are not, in fact, universally understood concepts. Samuel Huntington said that what is universalism or globalization to the West is imperialism to the rest. When I worked here in America, I thought, They are benign because they are dispensing democracy; and yet my own country experiences it as imperialism.

> *President Mbeki's obsession is how to retain sovereignty and integrity as a legitimate, proud, African democracy while trading within the rules of globalization.*
>
> —Franklin Sonn

There are two kinds of democracies: those that are established and those that are emerging. Established democracies are rich and strong in material resources; emerging democracies are rich and strong in ideas, yet those ideas often must be muted for fear of falling in disfavor. Emerging democracies are very short on resources and are very careful in the way in which they express themselves. The established and preeminent democracies are preoccupied with freedom—this is the term they use all the time—but the freedom is perceived as greater profits, which widens the chasm between them and the emerging democracies. The biggest concern that intellectuals in South Africa have at the moment is the survival of democracy. Because of that concern, there is increased control over civil society. In fact, civil society is less free today than under the apartheid regime. We have less access to resources for NGOs than under apartheid. In the established democracies, there is an obsession with a democracy that means free trade, the opening of markets, and the creation of an appetite for G-8 goods. In emerging democracies like South Africa, the obsession is with retaining and maintaining sovereignty. President Mbeki's obsession is how to retain sovereignty and integrity as a legitimate, proud, African democracy, while trading within the rules of globalization.

In established democracies there is a morality where the bottom line is the main tenet. We see it in the U.S. relationship with China; it's driven by the bottom line and not freedom or democracy. In the emerging economies there is doubt whether the capitalist ethic will make it. There is no serious intellectual in South Africa or in Russia who believes that the capitalist ethic is going to deliver for society. That is a major tension between the emerging and established democracies. Finally, and this is extremely frustrating for emerging democracies, the G-8 countries, and particularly the U.S., apply a "sieve," separating who is in and who is out. In every meeting they say you are in or you are out. If you look at figures today, the Muslim fundamentalist nations are out, they are not part of the debate, and Africa doesn't appear when serious statistics are given about growing world trade and economic systems. The only country in Africa they are grappling with and trying to mold is South Africa. And that is another source of our tension. South Africa and the emerging democracies want to remain part of the global agenda and not allow ourselves to be sifted out of the debate. Finally, we believe that all of this is determined by race.

Benjamin Barber: We started this discussion with a series of thoughtful, descriptive characteristics of civil society which had a certain easy, friendly, and uncontroversial quality to them; and as we proceeded to look at the experience of countries farther away from the United States and Europe and the G-8, the picture got much more complicated. The trajectory moved from the subject of civil society to a

discussion of another missing word, "power," and the relationship between power and civil society. Property, race, religion, uses of the military—all relate to the issue of power and who holds power.

The unspoken problem is that civil society, as a social science and descriptive term, is related to a series of issues that touch on power, on hegemony, and on sovereignty. The less we are willing to face those questions and talk about civil society and religion, civil society and Islam, civil society and race, civil society and AIDS, the less valuable the discussion will be. That suggests the dialectic we must engage in. Unless we talk about the intersection of power and civil society, we are going to be having a conversation only with ourselves.

The other question raised is: Can we talk about the word "global" and the term "civil society" in the same breath? What does that mean? One important way in which those are linked is with the new telecommunication technologies. In the next session we will discuss whether both traditional media and the new communications and information technologies are promising in strengthening civil society and democracy, or whether they, too, represent a form of corporate hegemony which will undermine rather than strengthen global civil society and democracy.

Martin Palouš: The basic concepts of democracy and civil society need further clarification, and I would add at least two others for our discussion. The topographic one is public space, in which democracy operates; and the social contract, which is evident in at least three transitions to democracy in the history of Western civilization. The first is the transition in the ancient city-states, expressed by Aristotle's distinction between life and "the good life." The second is the transformation to modern nation-states with all sorts of social contracts; the American Declaration of Independence is one example. The most challenging is the transition that has taken place in the late 20th century—democracy as an aspect of international relations. Tomas Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, said that there is one condition for the independence of the Czechoslovak state—the democracy of international relations. We see manifestations of democratic action in an international space in the Council of Europe and in the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights.

> *Unless we talk about the intersection of power and civil society, we are going to be having a conversation only with ourselves.*
>
> —Benjamin Barber

Bhikhu Parekh: There is the danger of making very simple-minded assumptions, which result in the discussion of civil society turning into a very anodyne, non-antagonistic, harmonious concept—as if everything is fine in the realm of civil society. Let me propose four ways to avoid that pitfall:

1. We should not equate democracy with liberal democracy.
2. We should not equate democracy and civil society. I can imagine democracies that don't have civil societies and can imagine vibrant civil societies that might not be democratic. For example, in many totalitarian or autocratic societies, you have vibrant associations—professional and so on—and yet the political power is left untouched.
3. We mustn't equate civil society with voluntary associations.
4. We must concentrate on the voluntary associations that have democratic goals.

Ira Harkavy: The question is not only about concept clarification, but about what's to be done to develop robust civil societies and optimal democracies. What are the actions that can help achieve that? We need to identify the kinds of organizations that are likely to advance optimal democracies in different societies, which relates to Bhiku's comments that all voluntary associations are not equally useful. I agree, too, with Kumi's statement that the role of higher education is both local and global. I propose that the critical issue we need to address is: What are the core agents to fulfill democratic life, recognizing that they would be different in different societies? Then we must ask: What is the relationship between higher education and practitioners, and what should it be?

Marginal groups get power by being involved in civil society and civil activities.

—Jessica Gordon Nembhard

We see that democracy is not assured; that the forces of commodification and commercialization have had both positive and devastating effects on the nature of how we learn and teach. Whether or not higher education serves the democratic purpose depends fundamentally on whether its own purposes are democratic and whether it works in collaborative ways with local NGOs and schools. Those of us in older democracies know, as Franklin indicated, that we are far from optimal democracies. With regard to race, poverty, and conditions of our society, we have to develop an action agenda that galvanizes the appropriate institutions in both established and non-established democracies.

Will Marshall: We create civic organizations for many reasons; sometimes for fellowship and at times out of prejudice. Some groups are defined by whom they exclude rather than by whom they include. It's by no means apparent to me that the simple efflorescence of civic action is *ipso facto* a good thing.

Gar Alperovitz: Organized labor was historically one of the most significant balancing forces to constrain corporate power in this country, not only directly within labor unions, but in support of other civil society organizations within the workplace. Labor unions peaked in the United States, including 35% of the labor force, during World War II. They have been in a steady decline; they are at 9% of the labor force now in the private sector, and they will be less than 4% within the next 15 years. We are losing one of the most fundamental of the civil society organizations, which was able to protect the arena from corporate dominance. In light of this decline, higher education may have a new role to play in advancing the action agenda. But we can't ignore the labor question.

Stephen Elkin: Democracy is either the effective control of authority by the people or it's nothing. There may be different routes to it and different ways of doing it, but we ought not to be in any doubt about what it is.

Jessica Gordon Nembhard: Resources and capacity are very important, but I think most of us are here because the ability to participate in civil society gives power to people who usually don't have it. Marginal groups get power by being involved in civil society and civil activities. We need to remember, too, that political democracy requires some kind of economic democracy, just as economic democracy clearly requires political democracy.

SESSION TWO

Technology and Global Civil Society

Globalization has been to a considerable degree fueled by innovation in telecommunications and information technology—above all, the Internet. The "new economy," so prominent in global markets, is largely a product of the information economy as it intersects with the service economy and the communications and entertainment industries (the "infotainment telesector"). Yet despite the early dreams of a new electronic frontier for democracy and culture through technology, especially on the web, for the most part the new technology has served commerce and consumerism far better than the much less profitable civic sector—especially in the international arena.

Among the questions we may want to pose are:

1. What are the inherent characteristics of the new technologies with respect to their impact on democracy and civil society? Does the technology have a "democratic architecture"? If so, is its positive impact on civil society automatic, or does it require planning, political decision-making, and democratic will?
2. Can we counter the seemingly natural tendencies of global market society to exploit the commercial and consumer side of the technology and leave the civic and democratic side behind?
3. What is the role for national governments? In the 1996 Federal Communications Act, the United States more or less privatized the new technologies across the board, assuming the marketplace would guide them adequately. Is this a good model? If government is to play a role, should it do so negatively, via rules and regulations, or affirmatively, by offering models and space on the Internet for civic and educational uses?
4. What is the experience abroad of government oversight? How do we coordinate national efforts so as to avoid international anarchy or nationalist competition (as when Europe's tight control over the use of private data acquired over the 'Net for commercial purposes comes into conflict with America's loose market rules)?
5. Can the Internet play a specific and constructive role in helping to establish global civil society? Can it help individuals and groups (as against governments and corporations) to create "virtual communities" that can counterbalance market and government forces? Are there software programs, portals, and other technological innovations available for those hoping to use the new technologies for civic purposes?

Session Resources: Keane, Nordfors, Schechter, Taplin

Benjamin Barber: Do the new telecommunications technologies, the Internet and the computer, as well as the older, traditional media play a role in strengthening democracy and civil society? What kind of a role? What kind of civil society do they contribute to—a democratic, free, and autonomous civil society, or one that's attached to hegemonic power? Jonathan Taplin has moved from one of the traditional media enterprises, film-making, into a new telecommunications technology—push technology. He'll address the more general question of whether these technologies are likely to assist or impede the development of civil society.

Jonathan Taplin: In the world that Ben described in *Jihad vs. McWorld,* telecommunications technology—particularly broadcast technology—acted as an adjunct to the American global, consumer, corporate society. In the current economic downturn, we can see the destruction of many firms and the loss of

billions of dollars in the stock market. Another result of the downturn is that the huge amount of bandwidths has enabled a new kind of revolution—a broadband revolution. My company delivers VHS-quality video on demand over ordinary telephone lines to consumers' PCs, set-top boxes, and other things. When you can deliver full-screen video on demand at the speed of 500 kilobits per second incredibly cheaply over IP networks, it seems to me a very democratic phenomenon. Despite fears that the great media conglomerates of the world will completely dominate communications, Internet protocol is a phenomenon that cannot be blocked.

Distance learning in developed and non-developed countries will become a powerful force and that will have a very democratic effect.

—Jonathan Taplin

In other words, when Time-Warner has a cable modem to a cable subscriber in Manhattan that's putting out 500 kilobits per second, you can type in a URL and get to any place you want. MIT is now putting every course it offers up on broadband video for anyone to audit, free of charge. That to me is very important. And MIT will be followed by other universities. Distance learning in developed and non-developed countries will become a powerful force, and that will have a very democratic effect.

The second thing is the ability of NGOs and political organizations to use these tools. When U.S. Senator John McCain went on the Senate floor for the Campaign Finance Reform bill, he made specific note of the role of the Internet and his own organization's ability to send e-mails to 650,000 people at once, and to ask them, with the click of a button, to send a petition back to their local representatives. It made it very easy to organize, very easy to make petitions work, and they were able to flood the senators who were on the fence with e-mails. These broadband networks capable of moving video are going to be a very powerful force.

In addition, they can prevent governments from playing an oversight role. Three years ago, the state media in China could hold up a story for weeks if it didn't want it to come out. That is impossible today because of the way information spreads by the Internet. But there *is* a role for government to play. Just as government funds now flow to public broadcasting, they could flow to organizations that use these tools to provide education and services. Because there is a surfeit of bandwidth, companies that own it are going to price the cost of transmission lower and lower. That means that the price of moving video from central service to consumers will get very cheap, and many NGOs and educational institutions will use it.

Benjamin Barber: Are the architecture and character of information technology *themselves* inherently democratic? Those who invented and began to use the Internet initially saw it as an electronic frontier for new kinds of horizontal, interactive democracy. However, on the whole, it hasn't been used that way. But the low cost of its architecture is absolutely vital, not just in the United States, but to the development of these technologies elsewhere, particularly in light of the so-called "leap-frog phenomenon," which permits countries that weren't part of the earlier technological revolution to catch up in a hurry. In Africa and China, for example, it's fairly clear that wireless communications will make the costly wiring of those nations unnecessary for them to join the revolution. So these technological issues, although they may seem arcane at times, are vital to the discussion of democracy.

John Keane: I have three observations. It's not possible to think about globalization and the development of world views without looking at the history of modern communications technologies, beginning with the printing press. The printing press was a time- and space-busting technique. The American Revolution is not understandable outside that context. The history of modern communications technology begins with Gutenberg and goes through overland and submarine cabling, through radio, television, and, especially since the 1960s, the development of wide-bodied jet aircraft, satellite, cable, and the World Wide Web. In every human order, including hunting and gathering societies, its members have had a world view—some view of the cosmos that served to plant their feet firmly in time and space. What is interesting is that the only recorded examples of cosmologies that linked the four corners of the earth were all modern and were all originally European. Islam narrowly failed to do that for various reasons that we won't discuss now. But I'm thinking of the whole imperial project, I'm thinking of Christendom's piggy-backing on empire in its attempt to bring spiritual salvation to the peoples of the earth, and I'm thinking also of the totalitarian projects of fascism and Marxism/Leninism. We know that each of these attempts to fashion and institutionalize a world view failed, but we also know that each of them left indelible marks on our lives. It is the backdrop of the failures of those cosmologies against which another world view is on the rise.

We are caught up in a great human adventure that is being carried out on a global scale, and that is called global civil society—a neologism of only the last 10 years. That new world view, different from those that preceded it, is not understandable outside the framework of the history of modern communications technologies.

The second point is more controversial. It's about the problem of the rule of law in the context of the emerging global civil society. Older civil societies, those of the modern European period, developed within the power containers of territorial states or empires. The current growth spurt of global civil society is in some way a rejuvenation of the late-19th-century project that was interrupted by World War I and a half-century of war, dictatorship, and totalitarianism. This phase, the globalization of civil society, is taking place under "lawless" conditions. There is no global empire, no global state. How, then, to provide legal protection for this emerging global civil society? It requires such protection through courts that guarantee the basic freedom of public association, that enforce contracts, preserve property, rule against violent crimes, and so on.

I find that we lack a language in which to describe the current mélange of legal jurisdictions that is beginning to crystallize globally. It hardly deserves the name of "system" because it doesn't resemble anything like world government. Historians will look back to the year 2000 and remember it as the year in which governments began to regulate cyberspace in earnest, thus highlighting a neo-medieval quality of the world we live in. In 2000 a French court ordered the Internet portal firm Yahoo to find a way to ban French users from seeing Nazi memorabilia posted on its American sites or face a daily fine of FF100,000. In Britain in the same year the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act gave the police broad access to e-mail and other online communications. In South Korea there was the outlawing of access to gambling web sites. So there are examples of territorial states getting involved in the business of legal regulation of the World Wide Web, but also supranational ones. The Brussels Convention lets consumers sue a foreign web site in their home country if the site can be proven to have aimed at that country's market; and the forthcoming

provisions of The Hague Convention, which is due to be adopted in June, is designed to enforce foreign judgments in matters such as intellectual property claims, contractual disputes, and libel.

My third probe is about public space. In Ed Herman and Robert McChesney's book *The Global Media: The Missionaries of Global Capitalism (Media Studies)*, they argue that the central feature of the media globalization of the past decade is the development of ever-larger, cross-border media companies, resulting in the intensification of a culture of entertainment featuring less news coverage, endless sports, the avoidance of controversy, minimal public participation, etc. Herman and McChesny quote Eduardo Galeano: "Never have so many been held *incommunicado* by so few. More and more have the right to hear and see, but fewer and fewer have the privilege of informing, giving their opinion, and creating. The dictatorship of the single word and the single image—much more devastating than that of the single party—is imposing a life whose exemplary citizen is a docile consumer and a passive spectator built on the assembly line following the North American model of commercial television."

> *I believe that we are witnessing the birth of global publics, which contains the promise that nobody should be allowed to monopolize power or be unaccountable. Global publics—the unintended child of the development of modern communications technology—imply greater parity.*
>
> —John Keane

It seems to me that this thesis doesn't account for some of the unforeseen consequences of the growth of commercialized media. There is growth on a global scale of public spheres in which millions of people witness non-violent or violent controversies about who gets what, when, and how. This event of "witnessing" occurs on a daily basis, ironically fueled by capitalist media corporations. There are many contradictory effects of such media.

I believe that we are witnessing the birth of global publics, which contain the promise that nobody should be allowed to monopolize power or be unaccountable. Global publics—the unintended child of the development of modern communications technology—imply greater parity. They move us toward more openness and humility, potentially to the point where power becomes more biodegradable, more responsive to the people whose lives it shapes and reshapes, cures or wrecks.

Danny Schechter: John's glass is half-full while mine is not even half-empty. Conflict certainly produces unintended consequences. In the U.S. there are profound questions about the nature of our own politics and our own political culture. In my book *Hail to the Thief* I discuss the "media-ocracy" that has evolved in our country, a joining together of media culture and political culture so that one doesn't live without the other; it has totally corrupted both institutions. The campaign-finance debate in the U.S. is not only about politics; one third of the money raised goes directly into the media, and media companies contribute increasing amounts of money and other resources to candidates. A report has just been issued by The Alliance for Better Campaigns in the United States showing that TV stations in America overcharge political candidates illegally, playing a corrupting role in the elections. Coverage of elections this year was half of what it was four years ago, and that coverage shifted from prime time to early mornings. And there were more comedians on the air talking about politics than analysts and journalists. The result is a narrowing of

political debate. Some colleagues and I have created MediaChannel to respond to the crisis of media-ocracy. We're using the Internet as a portal to bring together organizations from around the world into the discussion about media change. We started with 20 organizations a little over a year ago and now have 660 from 50 countries, including well-known newspapers like *The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique,* and *The Christian Science Monitor*, and many web sites. Our lead advisor is Walter Cronkite.

Benjamin Barber: My fear is that the democratic architecture of the Internet is itself contributing to the "depublicization," the privatization, and the fragmentation of our publics. The main users of the 'Net, including Napster, organize themselves around common, insular interests. The Internet, precisely because of it's democratic, bottom-up architecture, has created a series of fragmented, insular, "privates," not publics—people who talk directly to one another about issues that concern them.

The three networks today draw only 17% of the overall television audience. The question is: Will the democratization of the Internet lead to fragmentation, polarization, insularity, and, in time, the destruction of a civic public that actually talks to one another? I have a nightmare that down the line all of us will sit in front of our own web sites, looking narcissistically into our own "mirrors," and never communicating with any other human being. We haven't reached that yet, but we tend to communicate on the 'Net with people like ourselves, people with the same interests. The question is: Can we create a *public* on so fragmented and democratic a medium? It's very strength makes it a significant challenge.

Mikael Nordfors: I'm a bit of a foreign bird in this society of social scientists; I'm a doctor and a musician. What I've found is some common principles: the pestilence or cholera situation. Wherever you go you have pestilence—the state bureaucracy—or cholera—the capitalistic monopoly. I am trying to make something new so we can have a healthy society suffering from neither pestilence nor cholera.

The problem with large hierarchical organizations is that there is no feedback from the bottom to the top. Global corporations and state organizations have the same features; they have secret police harassing people who don't do the right thing. The main question is: How can we create an organization that promotes *healthy* people, not people who are only interested in their own power?

> *"[M]edia-ocracy"...has evolved in our country, a joining together of media culture and political culture so that one doesn't live without the other; it has totally corrupted both institutions.*
>
> —Danny Schechter

My aim is to increase the proportion of people who take part in decision making. I have a computer program, now in use, which addresses this problem by making it possible for everyone to be part of every decision. How? Clearly, no one can take part in all decisions; it's impossible even for full-time politicians to become knowledgeable and make informed decisions on everything. I have tried to solve that problem by creating flexible representative voting. You decide when to take part in decision-making and then vote on the Internet. When, however, you don't have time or you think you are not sufficiently informed or interested, you give your vote to a representative whom you choose yourself. And you can always take back the vote and vote yourself. You can have different representatives for different subjects, someone you trust

and who shares your values; you can have a professor of economics for economic issues, an environmentalist for environmental issues, etc. I would like to create a global democratic 'Net that could act as a virtual decision-making organ to coordinate the efforts of all the people on the planet. We need millions of dollars and millions of people to make this plan work. I have the soil and the seed; I just need some water and space and care, and it will work, I'm quite sure.

Martin Palouš: I think that the virtualization of public space by technology creates a dangerous imitation of it. It is interesting that this space is used so efficiently by pornographers and other non-civil elements in society. In the end, seeing is believing, and communication that is face-to-face between individuals is essential.

Ira Harkavy: What is the relationship between face-to-face community and virtual communication? If John Dewey is right, there can be no democracy without neighborly community, without face-to-face interaction. Still, we need to explore whether media technology, rather than being subversive, can make a positive contribution to local democratic life linked to global developments. And we need to examine ways in which technology can be used to advance learning at all levels of schooling.

Lisa Jordan: Let's look at the international financial institutions with regard to the Internet. The campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was run through the Internet. The Internet allowed for a number of people across different societies to come together to formulate their position as to why they were concerned about the MAI. We learned from this campaign that we could create a public space by means of a virtual process. As a result, those who came face-to-face were able to negotiate much more effectively. There are other examples: the International Campaign for Tibet, the campaign against landmines, to mention two. The ICT process is a tool, and the tool gets used for good or for bad.

Shibley Telhami: This discussion on technology cannot be divorced from the issue of power. Who has the resources to use this tool most effectively? In the case of the Middle East, the initial revolution was in the print media, which were privatized and became inexpensive to use. Then governments bought out the successful media companies and hired their most effective journalists. It is true in the U.S., too, that you can't understand who will win and who will lose until you understand who has the power and the resources.

There is no question that, in the short term, the new media in the Middle East are consequential in undermining what the governments have prepackaged before; they are eroding the unified view that governments present and are having a mobilizing effect. In the long term, however, the governments are laying claim to the new media. Everybody is competing for the largest market, and they are defining the consumer as an Arab rather than a national of Egypt, Jordan, etc. So the media are a unifying factor, but we don't know the full implications of that.

Adrian Karatnycky: The fact that Internet usage in China is growing creates an immense opportunity. We've worked with a group called VIP Reference, which, each day, using phantom sites, sends a digest of five or six articles about what they think people in China ought to know. It reaches over 900,000 e-mail addresses in China. Some people have gone to jail for giving them list-serves with 10,000 to 20,000 contacts, but they still continue to do it. Those forces and influences shouldn't be underestimated.

John Keane: In the field of communications and in political thinking, there has to be a re-writing of the textbooks. Since the 1960s, something new has been born—a global public in which many millions of people witness what is happening in the world. I think the category of "witnessing" is very important to bring into this discussion. To witness doesn't mean you're dumb nor that you don't speak out. The "witnessing" publics that I have in mind witness power controversies globally. They do so nonviolently and see something crucial about these controversies. When you are a member of such a public, you live in the subjunctive tense. But I think that through communications technologies, courts of appeal are being established globally. There are a number of power holders that previously got away with murder who are increasingly jumpy—the UN and the International Olympic Committee, to mention two. They are all jumpier, because they know they can be forced to appear before this court of appeal. The development of a global public sphere helps us get out of the territorial state framework and provides an important point of leverage in the globalization of civil society.

SESSION THREE

The Arts as the Unacknowledged Keystone of Civil Society

The arts can be seen as the vital center of a democratic society, yet are often marginalized not only in discussions of governance and the market but in talking about civil society, where their role may be most crucial. In repressive societies, the arts have often been deeply appreciated, precisely because they play a dissident and liberating role. In free societies, on the other hand, they are often taken for granted, and struggle to find a meaningful democratic purpose.

Our session on the arts will be held at the new Clarice Smith Center for the Performing Arts at the University of Maryland and will represent a kind of experiment. We will integrate into our extended deliberation—to be held in a dance studio—a performance by Martin Best, the renowned British tenor and composer, and Leah Kreutzer's LKB DANCE company (which has used Best's music in its work). Our aim is to concretize the discussion of the arts by thinking about the theoretical questions in the context of an actual performance. Among the questions we may pose are:

1. What is the role of the arts in civil society? Entertainer (jester!)? Amateur and community performance catalyst? The preservation of "high culture" and historical culture? Creativity and innovation? Direct political commentary (patriotism or critique)?
2. How can a free democratic society support the arts? Government funding can mean government interference and opens the arts to criticism and censorship by "offended" citizen groups. Private funding subordinates the arts to profit and makes cutting edge and controversial work problematic. What is to be done?
3. How do we integrate the need to focus the arts on the cultivation of individual artistic talent and expression with the need to extend arts education and the cultivation of audience as well as the democratic nourishment of "amateur," community, and folk arts? We can say "do both," but in practice we have tended to fund either an elite, artist-focused policy or a popular, community-focused policy.
4. The European experience has been government-centered, the American experience market-centered. What are the lessons each can teach the other? Is there a better way?
5. Can the arts play a specific role in cultivating civic globalism and a sense of citizenship and civil society across national boundaries? UNESCO, for example, has "cultural ambassadors." Are there other possibilities?

Session Resources: Best, Cohen-Solal, Farr, Kreutzer, Schell, Smith, Taplin

SUMMARY OF SESSION THREE

Unfortunately we did not record Session Three—the artistic performance, commentary and post-performance discussion—on audio or videotape. That omission is particularly regrettable as the Roundtable was intentional in including a session that featured a performance-based discussion of the role of the arts in civil society. As I reflect on a very exciting, highly energized and aesthetically and emotionally gripping performance followed by a stimulating discussion, I recall a comment by Nobel

Laureate Joseph Brodsky on his emigrating from Russia to the U.S. He noted that the price he paid for gaining his freedom was losing "significance."

The spirit of Brodsky's statement resonated in the discussion of the arts in society. In closed societies, it was noted, artists and intellectuals are more influential, more generally known and appreciated—largely because they are the notable dissidents, risking their freedom and sometimes their lives to express the anger, despair, and passion for freedom that others feel.

Participants reviewed the political, economic, and cultural tyrannies which impede free expression in open societies, too. They focused particularly on the cultural hegemony exercised by the United States, the oppressive intrusion of both government and corporate funders of the arts, and the lack of recognition and consideration of how important the arts and artists are to a democratic society.

The processes of experimentation and creation which occur in both the visual and the performing arts are, according to Leah Kreutzer, applicable—in fact, might be a useful model for—working things out politically. Kreutzer cited an experience she had in creating a dance duet, as she and her partner struggled with a particular set of movements. They decided to transform the problematic movements into a centrally important portion of the dance—and by working through them with care and new energies and ideas, were able to adapt the movements to the piece and the piece to the movements, making the whole work stronger.

There was consensus that the arts are critically important to civil society in fostering creativity and innovation, exemplifying and encouraging free expression, and communicating across national and cultural boundaries.

Most important, all agreed, the arts are important for their own unique capacity to express the full range of human emotions, thoughts, and dreams, and that the lives of individuals and societies are profoundly incomplete without the insights, expectations, and excitement the arts provide.

It was recommended by several participants that the arts be an integral part of future meetings of the International Roundtable.

—Sondra Myers

SESSIONS FOUR AND FIVE WERE INTEGRATED INTO ONE DISCUSSION

SESSION FOUR

Global Civil Society vs. Global Markets

Although there is a great deal of discussion about global civil society and global culture, in reality only the global economy has manifested itself in concrete ways. Indeed, globalization has led to a fundamental asymmetry between the political and the economic, with sovereignty to some degree passing from the political to the economic sector, and with profit becoming a primary criterion for global organization. This has occasioned a "race to the bottom" that has profited business and banks far more than the nations and peoples they serve.

There is a need to recreate globally the tripod of government, market, and civil society that describes healthy democracy. This session will focus on the primacy of markets and its consequences.

Among the questions we may want to pose are:

1. Is a market-centered globalism in its current form (in the absence of countervailing civic and governance forces) capable of sustaining civil society and democracy either within nation-states or internationally?
2. Today's global market governing institutions grew out of the Breton Woods Agreements after World War II, (IMF, World Bank), and were originally conceived to revive and redemocratize Europe. Yet today they are focused primarily on economic and corporate interests. Why and how have they become so undemocratic?
3. Since the Breton Woods institutions are under the control of governments and heavily influenced by the G-8, why do they seem so resistant to democratic and civic strategies and solutions? Many would argue they are more transparent and accountable than NGOs—yet they seem often to do the bidding of financial and corporate entities rather than of the governments that nominally control them. Why?
4. Is there a relationship between the neo-liberal ideology of privatization and distrust of government within the Western democracies, on the one hand, and the prevalence of neo-liberal, market-centered strategies in the global market?
5. How do we reconcile the need to protect and even favor the interests of the investors who are so desperately needed by developing nations with the need to protect the interests of the citizens of those nations in which investments are being made, when the protection of the investments often comes at the expense of government spending on citizen-oriented policies? How does this dilemma impact on the North/South divide?

Session Resources: Canrong, Dornsife, Matynia, Michnik, Palouš

SESSION FIVE

Global Civil Society and Global Governance

Obviously, there is a need for greater parity between economic and political institutions in the international arena. It is not so obvious, however, whether it is to be achieved exclusively through full-fledged international regulation and government, or whether it can be at least initiated by civic cooperation in an era of continued nation-state sovereignty. The key question is whether global civil society and some combination of traditional and new global institutions can play a role in governance in the absence of transnational sovereignty.

The role of the United States as the last remaining superpower is of particular relevance here. Despite the continued resistance of Congress, the United States has finally reached a "deal" on its UN obligations, and President Clinton signed the treaty establishing a new International Criminal Court (though it has not received congressional ratification). On the other hand, the new Bush Administration has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming and is moving ahead on missile defense despite resistance from its allies. And the U.S. has not signed the Law of the Seas Treaty, the Land Mine Treaty, and many other instruments of international cooperation, still seeming to prefer unilateralism to multilateralism in international affairs.

Among the questions we may want to pose are:

1. What kinds of specific transnational civic institutions are available as sources of global governance? Are they alternatives to or compatible with traditional United Nations institutions?
2. Does the idea of a "Tobin" tax (on international currency transactions) offer a concrete means of funding global civic work? What about microfinance and other market-oriented strategies?
3. Is there a meaningful international resistance movement to global markets? Do organizations like Attac represent a significant force for change? What is the relationship between first world resistance groups focused on preserving unions, local workers' rights, and safety standards, and the needs of developing nations that sometimes seem willing (even anxious) to compromise the same in order to get outside investment?
4. Can citizen-to-citizen and civic group-to-civic group forms of international cooperation make an impact on issues of governance? What is the role of the new technology here? (see Session 2).
5. Can global civic cooperation alone counterbalance the power of global corporations and financial institutions, or must they collaborate with and have the power of governments on their side to succeed?

Session Resources: Aviv, Rueda de Uranga, Estanislao, Kim, Sonn

Benjamin Barber: In this joint session (Four and Five) we will be linking together the three sectors that make up our modern world—the governance or state sector, the market or economic sector, and civil society as that "uncertain" sector between the two. Some think it's part of the state sector because it's public, and some think it's part of the market sector because it's voluntary. Because it is both public and voluntary, there is some ambivalence about how it fits between those two. In any case, we have three entities here and a set of relations among them. The first part of the meeting will focus on civil society and markets and the second on civil society and the state sector. Following that we will raise some outstanding questions on these issues and then decide where we ought to take this discussion in the

coming year in preparation for our June 2002 meeting in Berlin.

Adam Michnik translated from Polish by Elzbieta Matynia

> *[I]nstitutions of civil society cannot replace the state. Rather they must be in partnership with the state.*
>
> —Adam Michnik

Adam Michnik: Poland had an extensive civil society during its dictatorship, compared to other nations. Throughout the 1970s and '80s we created alternative institutions to the state—Solidarity, to name one—which were eventually pushed to the underground after the imposition of martial law. We also created institutions of alternative education, alternative culture, and above all, alternative labor unions. In fact, we introduced a whole alternative discourse. In '89 the communists gave up power and the alternative society became the state. In '90 we became a democratic state. We vowed to have a civil society. Now that we have a mechanism for creating new institutions of civil society, they are forming in opposition to the democratic state.

Civil society institutions are like a knife—you can cut bread with them or you can cut a man with them. In Poland those institutions are emerging under not-so-favorable internal and external circumstances. In the first place, we are facing corruption in politics. In European countries, and especially in the countries of post-communist Europe, corruption has become an element of the political system. It is the result of an ideological vacuum—ideas are not being replaced by anything new or fresh. It is a period of "velvet restoration," like the one in Stendahl's *La Rouge et Le Noir*. During the period of transformation in Poland, independent trade unions and the Catholic Church played an extraordinary role. The trade unions transformed themselves into a kind of political party that aspires to power. While Solidarity was, at first, a huge, anti-communist mass movement, when the Communist Party gave up power, Solidarity, which had shaped itself as a mirror image of the Party, was tempted to enter into the power void it left.

What does that mean? If in the past the Communist Party decided who was going to be the rector of a university, now Solidarity wanted to make that decision. If in the past the Communist Party decided who would be the ambassador to the U.S., now Solidarity wanted to make the decision. Today the myth of Solidarity is over, and it did not die a nice death. It transformed itself into a political movement that uses the language of populist vindication and nationalist and religious xenophobia.

For the last decade, that movement has had the support of the Catholic Church. During the communist dictatorship the Church was the last asylum for independent society. The Church, however, could not adapt to the new conditions of democracy after '89; instead, it was tempted to replace communist ideology with the hegemony of Catholicism. But society rejected that. Today, Poland is dominated neither by the Catholic Church nor by Solidarity. In this fall's elections in Poland, the post-Communist Party will undoubtedly win. The idea of civil society is completely alien to that Party; theirs is a power of special interests. Although it won't be a dictatorship, there will be little space for civil society. Post-communists in Poland have a Jacobean/Bolshevik vision of the state-—central power, giving away money in concession to others. How does that relate to the external context? I submit that what is taking place right now in Poland is taking place, to some extent, in all post-communist countries in the Eastern bloc. We are better off, it's true; but above all, it's a different world.

The fundamental issue in Europe today is the crisis of the European Union, which does not have an attractive offer to make to post-communist countries. It is not capable of answering such fundamental questions as: Where does the crisis in the Basque country come from? Where does the Haider phenomenon in Austria come from? Why are we not in a position to stabilize the situation in the Balkans? We are constantly being threatened by new wars.

So it is in this context that we look at the questions formulated for this meeting. Generally speaking, I share Ben Barber's view that globalization brings with it a great opportunity and a great danger. The opportunities for education, for example, are much better. Yet there is a threat of enormous forces, not controlled by anyone, which have come onto the scene. And markets with no limits means transnational dictatorships with no limits. We don't, however, have that kind of threat in Central Europe, because the big international corporations don't come to us. They are afraid to invest in us.

This discourse has different levels, different stages, and different layers, as Andrei Gratchev observed. We should build institutions of global civil society, but we must be aware that democratic institutions are being emptied of their core in many places. Not long ago we witnessed the crisis in Peru. It was a democratic state with a parliament and a multiparty system, but it was empty inside. The danger is that civil society institutions might be similarly empty of their core values. Regrettably, it is in this condition of an incredible deficit in democracy that we must build nongovernmental institutions. And that is not enough. The center of our attention and reflection should be the state itself, as institutions of civil society cannot replace the state. Rather they must be in partnership with the state.

Is this partnership possible, or is it a Utopian dream? I believe that it is possible and that global public opinion will emerge. Indeed, it was already emerging 100 years ago. The Socialist International represented international public opinion. At that time it seemed as though French and German socialists and social democrats would be in a position to stop the war; yet in 1914 the war broke out. How can we build institutions of civil society today that will be stronger than those that are emerging at the same time—the new waves of “Jihad”? I don't have a simple answer for that question, but I'm absolutely sure that "Jihad" is not a horse that is easily tamed. That is an American illusion, but we in Europe know that “Jihad” is a dangerous, wild creature. I was once a partisan of military intervention in Kosovo, but now I have cold feet.

> *How can we build institutions of civil society today that will be stronger than those that are emerging at the same time-the new waves of "Jihad"?*
>
> —Adam Michnik

There are a few of us here from Central Europe, and we look quite differently at Russia. I recently published in my newspaper [*Gazeta Wyborcza*] an essay by Andrei Gratchev on the "Bourbons" of the Russian Communist Party. It also looks different in the Czech Republic where the Communist Party is a real Stalinist party. In Romania, there are several post-communist parties. Poland looks the best because we have completely civilized our post-communists. They are corrupt, but they are corrupt in the style of Helmut Kohl[2] and not in the style of Berlusconi.[3] Post-communists are not social democrats; they are the party of the *ancien régime*. They

2. Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, 1982-1991; Chancellor of United Germany, 1991-1998.
3. Prime Minister of Italy, 1994-.

have three features in common across national borders: common biographies, a common fear of facing communization, and common economic interests. They own the oldest companies, which they established in privatized terms early on. Outside of those three common features, they are *completely* different from one another. You find everyone from nostalgic Stalinists to radical conservatives of the school of Margaret Thatcher. But the bottom line is that they don't want to return to communism because they know that under the communists they did not have it as good as they have it now!

> *I suspect that civil society, if it's not "tough" civil society, will be unlikely to compete either with the neo-despotic political forces or the corporate forces with which it has to contend.*
>
> —Benjamin Barber

In this sense, we have civilized them. When I was in prison, I always divided the prison guards into "good" and "bad." The "bad" guard was the one I was able to bribe. If I gave him a pack of cigarettes he allowed me to get something I wanted. The worst were the "good," uncorrupted guards. You could not arrange anything with them. You could not make any deals. So our post-communists are bad, that is, corruptible guards.

Benjamin Barber: I think that the essence of what you said, which is very important, is that for civil society to be relevant, it needs to be muscular. We use the expression "tough love." Liberals like to use love to solve problems, but love doesn't solve problems unless it's tough love. I suspect that civil society, if it's not "tough" civil society, will be unlikely to compete either with the neo-despotic political forces or the corporate forces with which it has to contend.

Danny Schechter: Our media seem to present two counter myths; one says that the communist system in Poland was toppled by the CIA, and the other credits the Pope. Where were the Polish people? Where was the political culture—the civil society—created and nurtured by Solidarity?

Adam Michnik: There were two factors in the collapse of communism: the real social movement, in which both the Church and the Pope played a role, and the external movement launched by Gorbachev and *perestroika*. Without *perestroika* it would not have been possible to have any conclusive, systemic changes. There would have been rebellions and revolutions, but it would not have been possible to create something lasting. There is no doubt, too, that American politics had some influence on what was taking place in Central Europe, but it was not a decisive influence. The strategists in the CIA probably believe that it was they who caused the collapse of communism. The policemen from the KGB believe that it was they who ran the peace movements in Western Europe, and that they are running the revolution in Nicaragua. They believe it, but don't believe them.

Elzbieta Matynia: To add to what Adam has said about Solidarity, it was an amazing movement which created the first institutions we had in Poland that taught people how to create institutions. Above all, it created an amazing *res publica*—a public space that turned people's attention for the first time to the possibility that they could do something. What is happening right now—as we have just celebrated the 20th anniversary of Solidarity in Poland—is that there is a sense of embarrassment. People who were the key leaders, who had both muscle and heart—tough love—during the critical moments of Solidar-

ity, feel embarrassed and have gone through a kind of amnesia. They don't even want to talk about those amazing 16 months in 1981 of building, creating, and inhabiting that public space which suddenly opened in Poland for the first time in their lives. Not only is the Solidarity myth gone, but the memories of a movement which generated volunteerism as well as love and emotion are by and large gone, too. It was a pre-modern phenomenon—not institutionalized enough.

I want to talk about two other things. One is the events in Quebec.[4] There is a sense of uncertainty about what is happening in the world. A Polish sociologist in England, Sigmund Bauman, has written that globalization generates a "political economy of uncertainty." We sense that there are large, nontransparent forms of rule emerging, which are illegal but are increasingly more "legal" or legalized. According to Bauman, economic globalization is transforming itself into rigid, legal regimes, which are difficult to debate because they are based on quasi-constitutional laws. Perhaps they are standards, but they assume the role of laws. On the other hand, if you look at civil society, another kind of regime is emerging—a human rights regime, perhaps a growing balance. There are more and more things that people can do *outside* nation-states, in fact, independent from what their own nation-states' laws are. It's possible that nations will not have the disciplinary power over their citizens or their own rules anymore. Let's look at the possibility of a kind of balance between the regime created by a global capital market on the one hand and the regimes of human rights emerging from civil society on the other.

4. The Summit of the Americas meeting, April 20-22, 2001, at which the adoption of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement was discussed. Massive protests were staged, and hundreds were arrested.

Regarding the connection between academia and NGOs, I want to make this observation. Human rights NGOs have contributed a great deal to academic methodologies in the social sciences; ways to document human rights abuses, to mention one. We in universities found allies in these organizations that we didn't know we had, and have benefited by bringing them into the academy and mixing the two worlds together. We would be in bad shape without them.

> *Solidarity...was an amazing movement which created the first institutions we had in Poland that taught people how to create institutions. Above all, it created an amazing* res publica*—a public space that turned people's attention for the first time to the possibility that they could do something.*
>
> —Elzbieta Matynia

Martin Palouš: Regarding the triangle of government, markets, and civil society, it seems to me that markets and civil society have in common the notion of public space. As Hannah Ahrendt pointed out in *The Human Condition*, public space is the place where people can go and meet other people. Even those who come with their merchandise need to have the courage to appear in person to show themselves and to communicate with others.

There are two competing concepts of freedom that need to be well balanced: the concept of freedom as freedom *from* politics—something that government should guarantee to all private entrepreneurs and their activities—and the freedom *to take part in* politics. One of the fundamental things we discovered at the onset of the Velvet Revolution was that

individual citizens simply had to *claim* their right to speak about and act upon public issues. Are we going to have communities with public squares where we can have a good mixture of public and private activities, or will we transform our squares into shopping malls and ourselves into shoppers?

I think that democratic governance is both self-limiting and compassionate; and it is a necessary condition for civil society.

—Martin Palouš

Concerning the politics of transition, Czechs might be known as champions of neo-liberalism in the post-communist period. Since the beginning of the '90s, we have Vaclav I—Vaclav Havel—and then the current prime minister, Vaclav Klaus—Vaclav II. Klaus thinks, with Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, that we should have free markets first, with an uncontrolled, spontaneous process, rather than law first, which comes from the concept of freedom as responsibility.

I believe that the only concept we can consider is freedom as responsibility. Civic dialogue cannot be driven by spontaneity—or perhaps I should say anarchy—which produces no consensus. Public space can only be created in the context of self-limitation, a place where compassion for others is present. I have the same doubts as Adam. Can we rely on global civic organizations to be self-limiting and compassionate? I think that democratic governance is both self-limiting and compassionate; and it is a necessary condition for civil society.

Miklos Marschall: From my own very practical perspective, global civil society is about the public good. We now have many organizations and institutions in a position to define the public good, and that means a dramatic increase in the freedom of action. What we see in the global arena is a growing number of organizations and a growing number of people—intellectuals and organizational leaders—entering the civic arena and trying to define the public good. Transparency International is one of the organizations that managed to define a new public good—transparency and good governance. In the last 15 years we have seen a growing number of non-state actors introducing new public goods. In my view, that's the global civil society.

We should be very objective about global civil society. It is extremely competitive; it operates like a market with very entrepreneurial actors, tough competition, a high birth rate, and a high death rate. It has much more similarity to the market than we tend to acknowledge.

Cinnamon Dornsife: In the Philippines very few public spaces exist; they are taken over by consumer malls. But the Filipinos have turned malls back into public spaces. They have trees and church services and playgrounds—many of the activities that are traditionally carried on in a public square.

Now I'll turn to banking and international financing and address some of the questions posed here for this session. The Asian Development Bank lends about $6 billion every year and gives about $175 million in grants for technical assistance for capacity building. It also catalyzes investments, though relatively few. We claim as our over-arching mandate poverty reduction, but we also have a mandate for private-sector development.

What is the nature of these economic institutions? Are they transparent? Accountable? Are they democratic or are they really focused on promoting private-sector interests? What we do is provide capacity-building assistance to our largest borrowers

to develop their own indigenous consulting services, local governments, and citizen providers. Forty percent of the Bank's loans are devoted to poverty reduction. A lot of that goes right back to the borrowing countries.

The Asian Development Bank has become much more transparent in the time that I've been there. Documents which were not available five years ago are available now, including those revealing our countries' strategies regarding assistance and loans, technical assistance, and planned investments. Draft policies are available on the Internet, and people are encouraged to access and comment on them.

We have an anti-corruption policy and a good-governance policy that the United States helped us to formulate. There are mandates for participation, transparency, predictability, for a greater respect for the rule of law, and for all of the things that global civil society is calling for. The real issue for me is the quality of participation. If we had a participation policy, we would be held accountable in very specific terms for greater participation around the world by all of our shareholders and by citizens in our shareholding countries. The United States has been calling for decisions to be made on the basis of public expenditure reviews; that requires an analysis of government spending. What allocation is made for the social sectors? For education? For basic health? How much of that goes to women? How much of that goes to children? How much truly impacts the poorest sectors of society? We talk about poverty reduction, but how do we measure it? And how are we doing at really addressing the needs of the poorest?

Edward Mortimer: The IMF and World Bank were created by the Breton Woods Agreements. The World Trade Organization is a much more recent creation and is technically not part of the United Nations system. In the '80s and early '90s, the World Bank followed the IMF's lead in pushing for a very rigorous, neo-orthodox version of structural adjustment, which is now recognized as having done great social damage in many developing countries. [World Bank President] James Wolfensohn has been trying to move away from that linear approach, but it is very difficult to turn around such a vast, powerful bureaucratic institution. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has been trying to bring these organizations into a conversation with each other and remind the world and the leaders of the Breton Woods institutions that they are part of the United Nations family. The WTO is becoming, *de facto*, a member of that family as well. The family is a very loose one; I don't know if democratic is the right word, but it is certainly not a monarchical family. Its Administrative Committee on Coordination, which meets twice a year and which is chaired by the secretary-general, is essentially a body of equal heads of institutions who are responsible to their own governing bodies. Mike Moore, the head of the WTO, attends those meetings. I would say they are focused primarily on corporate interests, in so far as the governments that are their masters and shareholders are focused on those interests. Are they resistant to democratic and civic strategies and solutions? They seem to do the bidding of financial and corporate entities rather than of the governments that nominally control them.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are controlled by the governments of a fairly small number of very rich countries. In the case of the WTO, the nominal control is shared equally among all the members, which is nearly all the countries of the world. The reality of power, however, is very different from that. If, for example, you are Bangladesh and there is a negotiation in Geneva, you probably can't afford to have a representative there. And if you do, he or she is very unlikely to have the kind of backup resources and advice that the delegations of Britain or the United States or Japan would have. The problem is that the *reality* of power has more to do with the unequal distribution of wealth in the world than it has to do with the actual governing structures of these institutions. We need to think about ways in which governments can be made more representative of the broader social interests in their countries.

The reality *of power has more to do with the unequal distribution of wealth in the world than it has to do with the actual governing structures of these institutions.*

—Edward Mortmer

Silvia Rueda de Uranga: I think that the politics of the World Bank are, by and large, good for the people. The problem is that the representatives of our government who sit at the table represent the interests of business. We need a government that is more sensitive and more responsible to the people's needs.

[I]n East Asia....our challenge is not to whittle down the power of government but to make governments more effective, more participatory, and more socially responsible.

—Jesus Estanislao

Jesus Estanislao: Let me present an Asian perspective, which contrasts with the European perspectives. Many of us in Asia have a preference to "fudge" and put together, while the Europeans tend to distinguish and set the sectors apart. We don't make much of a distinction between the private and public sectors. In fact, for participation and consultation, we consider it essential that representatives of what we call civil society are brought to the table along with representatives of governments. In fact, we have prior consultations. Governments in our region tend to be rather weak. One of our biggest challenges is to strengthen them and make them more effective and responsible. To give you an idea of how weak our governments are, they cannot even collect proper taxes. That is true of many countries in East Asia. So our challenge is not to whittle down the power of government but to make governments more effective, more participatory, and more socially responsible.

The same thing is true with markets. Our economies are relatively underdeveloped. Our challenge is not to weaken markets but rather to strengthen them, making them much more effective and more law-abiding. From the Asian perspective, we want strong governments leading strong markets, and the two of them in close cooperation with one another.

I would like to challenge the views that the IMF and World Bank are not responsive to the people, that they just talk with governments. In a number of East Asian economies, governments talk with the people. And before we talk with the World Bank and the IMF, we make sure that the views of the people are represented. In our view, the interests of banks—of investors and corporate interests—are the interests of the people, especially if they generate quite a lot of employment, raise the levels of development, and bring about prosperity. This may be a very unusual view, and I realize I might be provoking a lot of you.

Barbara Shailor: There's one glaring omission in this discussion, and that's the reality that came out of the ravages of World War I. There was a general consensus among world leaders that it was necessary to improve the conditions and lives of workers in order to create peace and stability. That was reaffirmed after World War II in the International Labor Organization's Declaration of Philadelphia. It is at the very heart of the current political paralysis in our own country around trade issues such as NAFTA, two fast-track votes, and negotiations around the multilateral agreement on investment in Paris, Seattle, Quebec, etc. And there are these fundamental questions: Can you include worker-rights-related issues in trade and investment agreements? And, in terms of civil society, can the labor movement have a seat at the table?

There are things in the multilateral system that are incomprehensible. For example, can Juan Somavia, the director-general of the International Labor Organization, be invited to the WTO to speak? The answer to that question in Seattle was no. Can Juan Somavia talk about worker rights at the regional banks? The answer is no. Can the cooperative agreements that exist between the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO extend to the ILO? The answer is no. What is generally perceived as a labor backlash, we at the AFL-CIO would suggest is not a backlash but rather a civil society movement that we see as a positive sign. It is not so much a resistance as it is a coalition of forces—church groups, trade union groups, environmental groups, groups in the South, groups in the North—workers around the world, looking at a different kind of globalization. Different from what is very politely referred to as market-oriented globalization, I think we ought to call it by its right name, which is corporate-driven globalization. And the corporations that are driving it most are American corporations. What we need to ask here is: Where is the public space for mass-based organizations that not only have a right to be at the table, but are ultimately the citizens of the world that are affected by the globalization?

Lisa Jordan: I take issue with Jesus' and Cinnamon's claims that the governments represent the people and, thus, the people are represented in multilateral development bank decision-making. There are no elected officials sitting on the boards of the multilateral development banks or the WTO, IMF, or World Bank at this time. And when parliaments ask for the right to review documents that are under negotiation within these banks, they are told they don't have that right. So where is the public representation? There is a fundamental democracy deficit, and I think civil society needs to address that. I believe our friends from developing countries have been dealing with this deficit much longer than people in the U.S. and Western Europe.

> *Can you include worker-rights-related issues in trade and investment agreements? And, in terms of civil society, can the labor movement have a seat at the table?*
>
> —Barbara Shailor

There's a revolving door between ministries of finance and the multilateral development banks. So often you're negotiating with a colleague who used to work right next door to you.

When there is a process whereby decisions that are taken up with the boards of the IMF, WTO, multilateral development banks, and the World Bank are open to the public, there will be an accountable process. Today the process is not accountable, transparent, or participatory.

Cinnamon Dornsife: I will first respond to comments on labor issues and then, secondly, on transparency

and accountability at the banks, particularly the Asian banks. In terms of workers' rights, under the guidance and leadership of the Clinton-Gore administration, the United States was able to move forward an agenda of core labor standards, including freedom of association, as principles of the Asian Development Fund, which is the soft-loan window of the Bank. There was total agreement on eliminating the most egregious forms of child labor. That is just a start, but I am encouraged because the governments of the Peoples Republic of China, India, and Pakistan are party to that agreement. In terms of parliaments and participation, I admit there are limitations to access.

> *What I hope will come out of discussions like this one is that emerging democracies will develop a sense of coherence; that we will come at this issue collectively and cleverly, and that we will participate in the writing of the rules of* pax americana *globalization, and thereby play a constructive role.*
>
> —Franklin Sonn

Regarding participation, I would urge you to lobby your governments to consider it. Once a policy has been adopted by the board of directors, it is mandatory that all our loans—technical assistance, private-sector investments—uphold that policy. So if participation is mandatory and we define very clearly in a working paper that it means a policy open for comment at the early draft stages, you would have the opportunity to have input. That would take the institutions a step further toward greater accountability, transparency, and more participation.

Barbara Shailor: Worker rights as defined by the International Labor Organization and as re-defined in 1998 include four basic principles. The first is freedom of association. Freedom of association, in workers' terms, means the right to form a union and bargain collectively. At the World Bank and the IMF, and in the current paralysis of the WTO, is the issue of whether freedom of association—as a political principle as opposed to what the Bank would say are economic principles—has a place in the banks. I think there is nothing more fundamental to what we are trying to accomplish here than that basic issue. Can you have democracy for workers, and can it be recognized in a multilateral system? At the AFL-CIO we would not be so rigid as to say that the *only* way you can move that principle is by having it as an enforceable worker right in trade and investment agreements.

At the end of the Clinton administration, there were negotiations with Jordan and between the AFL-CIO and the Jordanian trade union movement and the Jordanian Chamber of Commerce. We negotiated a free trade agreement in the context of the peace process in the Middle East. The body of the agreement said that each country shall respect its worker rights and environmental standards. The U.S.

government agreed, the Jordanian government agreed, the U.S. and Jordanian labor movements agreed, the Jordanian Chamber of Commerce agreed, and the U.S. business community went berserk. Within the context of the Bush administration, companies feel that they have the ability to ride this issue out. We will not see negotiations going forward now. The question then becomes: Do you just pull support from the institutions (the Bank, the IMF, the WTO) altogether because they have no legitimacy? We in the labor movement are calling for reform of the financial institutions. We believe that we must reform and not delegitimize them. These institutions are at a very fragile schism point right now. I believe that the more progressive parts of that business community ought to step forward and address the issue while there is still time.

Franklin Sonn: We are trying to create the parameters of society. The post-Cold War regime, which determines civilization, is perceived by emerging democracies as a *pax americana*. How do we deal with that? I believe that it is possible to do so. What is critical is that the great "monster" and world dominator of globalization is perhaps the American-imperialist power we created. But I believe that we can access that power. I don't think we should abandon ship. Because by doing so we are saying that we are not able to impact the power structure. We are simply saying one thing: Don't talk to me about AIDS, talk about *poverty*, because AIDS is intimately related to poverty.

Forty-four percent of the world's population today lives under democracy, and in 1974 it was 30%. But is poverty being relieved? In the U.S., it isn't. In 1990 the family income of the top 1% of Americans was greater than the bottom 40%. Nearly one in five U.S. workers lives in poverty. The average CEO salary is more that 150 times that of the average worker. And this is in "the great democracy"?

The U.S. is caught in a dichotomy. It enters emerging democracies saying: We want to provide a better life for your people, for the poor. We have to break the logjam of poverty. But we also want to make maximum profits, and we want to determine the rules of how that's going to be. That creates for all of us in emerging democracies an almost impossible situation.

When I came to the U.S. as South African Ambassador in 1995, one of the things that came up in discussions with my friends in government was how to deal with the World Bank. They didn't tell me how, they just said: Deal with it. My first message to the Bank was: We will take no loans from you; we'd rather die in poverty, unless we can talk about your conditions. That came as an unbelievable snub to the World Bank. [World Bank President] Jim Wolfensohn is a personal friend of mine, and that was fortunate, as we could talk about it when relaxing in the garden on Saturday afternoon. He said: This must be a mistake. I said: Okay, let's talk about the conditionalities. It stands to South Africa's credit (and thank God for Mandela, because nobody wants to be seen as an enemy of Mandela) that we changed the conditions. Today the World Bank *tries* to operate differently, and to Jim Wolfensohn's credit, he tries his best to meet the kinds of demands that Barbara Shailor refers to.

> *Karl Popper noted that one of the great strengths of the politics of open society is its reversibility; that those who are in power can be replaced by others with different policies.*
>
> —Martin Palouš

Secondly, we must take on the transnationals, but we must take them on in a productive way. We must say we are part of globalization because that's a

reality, not because we like it. And at the same time we must say what's acceptable to us and what's not. We say we are not going to pay your drug prices because we are not a G-8 country. And we are going to question what you present to us as intellectual property rights. We want to sell generic drugs in order to meet the health demands of our poor, which is almost 50% of the South African population. The drug companies mustered an enormous fight against us. We conducted this fight respectful of the rules and won. Today, we sell generic drugs and our relationship with the U.S. is still perfectly good. So my suggestion is that we do *not* allow the big monoliths to dictate terms altogether; that we do not look upon the U.S. and all the G-8 countries as an insurmountable problem. And we do that like we "eat the elephant"—piece by piece.

> *With regard to the "golden triangle" of government, market, and civil society, it will depend on us to avoid an antagonistic relationship among the three angles and work toward mutual acceptance, mutual necessity.*
>
> —Andrei Gratchev

Where we have the advantage is that the superpower is a democracy. And it is less sure of itself than emerging economies and markets often think it is. What I hope will come out of discussions like this one is that emerging democracies will develop a sense of coherence; that we will come at this issue collectively and cleverly, and that we will participate in the writing of the rules of *pax americana* globalization, and thereby play a constructive role.

Benjamin Barber: I know as an American that American hegemony is a political and economic reality that sometimes will brook no participation from the rest of the world, and it needs tough resistance as well as the participation you're talking about.

Martin Palouš: We are living in times of transition. The processes we have to understand and take part in are open-ended processes, and our goal is the establishment of open societies. We should be aware of one paradox. Karl Popper noted that one of the great strengths of the politics of open society is its reversibility; that those who are in power can be replaced by others with different policies.

Andrei Gratchev: When Franklin spoke at the South African Embassy on our first evening together,[5] I had the feeling he was speaking about the Russian situation, when actually he was referring to the South African one. For me that is proof of the globality of the problems and confirmation of the fact that global civil society is possible. Which aspects of globality are problematic? We are living in an "epoch gap." How do we handle this critical situation when the former instruments cease to function? We are going through a phase of turbulence. How do we act? How do we react? There are two ways of responding. One is a pessimistic way, the other an optimistic one. Pessimistic is renouncing the belief in democracy and resorting to what, in the American case, is not isolationism but unilateralism, which could qualify as imperialism. In the global context of unilateralism is seen a new imperialism, which, quite logically, provokes anti-imperialism. In the new world context, and after witnessing the bankruptcy of the great ideas to which Adam referred, the only remaining great ideas (again I'm citing Michnik) is nationalism. If this unilateral version of globalization is provoking unilateral responses, then we shouldn't be surprised at seeing new "Talibans" appearing across the world, be they Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, or whatever.

5. April 19, 2001, at the opening reception of the International Roundtable

Another manifestation of the pessimistic vision of globalization is Sam Huntington's vision of a future world in which you protect yourself against the probable clash of civilizations. And since the West, for the time being, has the best means to protect itself, it goes ahead with this protection.

That brings me to the second aspect of the situation, the long-term consequences. If we manage to handle the transitory short-term period, it's important to make use of it to try to determine who the new players are. There are national bureaucracies and unrestrained capitalism that won't be governed either by law or by competition. We will observe new social features, this time not with individual societies but inside global world society. These new class structures may take the computer form; for example, the "golden billion" of the Internet who would be separated, in spite of the possibilities of new technology, from the remaining billions in the world that remain illiterate and suffering from world epidemics. There is another manifestation of the misunderstanding among the agents of the new global world. Because if globalizing capitalism breaks down barriers like customs and national borders, it also rebuilds walls, like the wall that protected participants in the Quebec summit from the demonstrators in the streets. It is a fantastic paradox that a new wall is being constructed only 12 years after the Berlin Wall was pulled down. With regard to the "golden triangle" of government, market, and civil society, it will depend on us to avoid an antagonistic relationship among the three angles and work toward mutual acceptance, mutual necessity.

Gar Alperovitz: How do we define the epoch we are in? In the United States belief in the effectiveness of democracy has gone from 80% of the people believing the government represented them, 30 years ago, to 70% now saying government is controlled by corporations and special interests. The trajectory of disbelief is well known. At the heart of it is the corporation and the power of wealth. One percent of the people own 43% of the wealth in the United States. In addition, there is a radical decline of the most powerful counter to that in the industrial world—the trade union movement. Organized labor in this country peaked at 35% of workers after World War II. In the private sector it is now only 9%, and even with the best efforts of very good leadership, the hope that it will increase is very slim. That means we are in a different systemic context; one in which the corporation increasingly dominates finance ministries unchallenged by the one powerful civil society institution sufficient to the task. Thus, the process of delegitimization goes forward. If we ask Adam's question about what the West has to offer, then either there is no answer, which may very well be; or we might say that we're in a period of fundamental transition, during which we need a two-legged strategy: the rebuilding of civil society that Franklin Sonn refers to, and an action agenda of the kind Ira Harkavy is talking about. The corporate-dominated capitalist system—not countered by a significant labor movement—raises a very nasty issue that we must confront as we go forward. It is our turn and our task to build the new vision. I want to put that right in the center of our conversation.

> *[T]here is a radical decline of the most powerful counter to that in the industrial world—the trade union movement.*
>
> —Gar Alperovitz

Kumi Naidoo: Gar's comments are like a body blow to me. It confirms the pessimism that we have to confront from the practitioners' side on a daily basis. I want to make three points. First, I think that it's true that many of the major institutions don't want

to engage in the discourse on poverty. But in fact there is evidence that, at least at the lip-service level, poverty is on the agenda. For me the issue is not so much poverty as the deepening structural inequality, both within nations and between rich and poor nations. Failure to make that linkage is just losing the whole point. Structural inequality is getting deeper and deeper; all the statistics show that. That raises a fundamental question about the link between what we call representative democracy and economic democracy. Today those two things are quite separate. When we talk about the crisis of democracy or the failure of democratic institutions, we're really looking at the levels of political participation in the electoral process. When I look at the United States as an outsider, my cynical view is that there are only three types of people who can successfully contest political power and win in this country: those who are rich, those who are extremely rich, and those who are obscenely rich.

If we don't change the models of economic development and economic governance, and the models of wealth-creation and distribution, then we can't change much.

—Jessica Gordon Nembhard

As an outsider looking in, this doesn't make sense. We talk about the democratic deficit in the U.S., and increasingly about economic apartheid in the U.S. How do we link the two? The question is: Is representative democracy delivering the kind of political institutions and leadership that actually enable a serious stab at the economic questions?

My second point is about global governance and the dysfunctionality of global government institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO; and on the civil society side, the United Nations. Let's look at the UN as an example of the dilemma we face about what the project of reforming these institutions is. Is it a project of recognizing that the world has changed fundamentally over the last 45 years and that we require a fresh look at what global institutions are necessary? Or is the project to do a little tweaking here and there? Recall that the UN was a creation of the victor nations of World War II. In 1945, when the rules of the UN were developed, more than half of the world was in colonial bondage. And as those nations were freed of colonial bondage they were added to the UN, one by one. My real anxiety is that though organizations like CIVICUS support the reform process of the UN as well as the World Bank and other international financial institutions, we are pessimistic about the UN succeeding sufficiently in its reform to increase its capacity to deliver what humanity actually needs now, given the current global environment.

The third and final point concerns the international financial institutions themselves. When the Asian financial crisis happened, there was talk about the need for a new international financial architecture by President Clinton, Jim Wolfensohn, and others. Those institutions pose a distinctive problem for us. Martin Cole, who heads the Third World Network, always says that the problem with these institutions is that they are governed on the basis of one dollar, one vote. That means that the power within them in terms of governance is based largely on how much money you put into them. The United States, for example, commands approximately 33% of the power in the World Bank. The challenge, from civil society organizations' point of view, is how do you actually address this issue? Where do you put your energies? There are three views. One view says the system is completely dysfunctional and that we should put our energies into a long-term campaign to develop a new vision; the AFL-CIO, for example, is saying we have to think of a completely new

paradigm. There are others within civil society who recognize that we are faced with the reality that our people must deal with in terms of the day-to-day policies of these institutions; and they say we can't wait for a long-term victory. So many of us are engaging the Bank and the other institutions in discussions of ways to limit the harmful effects of some of their actions. CIVICUS is one of these organizations that does talk to the Bank; and I can tell you that the people within our membership from the South don't like that at all. The space for dialogue is decreasing.

Jessica Gordon Nembhard: It's obvious from our conversation that participation per se is necessary but not really sufficient. The diversity of voices isn't really enough. We need to decide on a model of participation and identify the economic models that we are trying to participate in. If we don't change the models of economic development and economic governance, and the models of wealth creation and distribution, then we can't change much.

John Keane: Transnational corporations are not interested in investing in certain regions. Global civil society, as it exists, excludes most of the world's population—the Peruvian economist Hernando DeSoto calls it "capitalist apartheid." I think that's a basic structural problem in the global system.

With regard to the development of global marketization, I would recommend to you a book titled *The Great Transformation*, by Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi, published in 1944 in London. What's interesting about this book, and remarkably prescient, is that it is an account of the rise in Europe, and the global effects of the mid-19th-century utopian idea of an unlimited, unrestrained market. Polanyi shows in a tragic account that it produced total war in 1914 and what is called euphemistically in Europe "the social question." It led to the birth of a trade union movement because, according to Polanyi, it was the first-ever recorded civilization in human history that sought to disembed markets—to suppose that market forces could operate independently of social institutions like households, community associations, and governmental regulations. You may not agree with Polanyi's recommendations, but I see a parallel structure now. We are living in a phase that began during the 1980s, in which the globalization of investment, exchange, production—the development of global labor pools, etc.—represents once again the disembedding of markets, but this time on a global scale. The problem is how to re-embed those forces into social institutions—to draw them back into existing and future civil societies and to give them the force of legal regulation.

Transnational corporations are not interested in investing in certain regions. Global civil society, as it exists, excludes most of the world's population-the Peruvian economist Hernando DeSoto calls it "capitalist apartheid."

—John Keane

We lived until the end of the Cold War, according to Raymond Aron's famous formula, in a period in which peace was impossible and war unlikely; that was one of the features of the nuclear global order. With the collapse of bipolar confrontation, the situation has changed radically. Although there is no immediate threat of nuclear confrontation, all the signs are there of a basic anarchy within the global political order, a nuclear-tipped order. Look at the symptoms: Depleted uranium shells are now dropped randomly and regularly on the victims of war, nuclear weapons abound—7,000 nuclear warheads in the United States and the Russian Federation; and we have the possible tearing up of

the 1970 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and talk of national missile-defense systems. I draw from this the conclusion that the talk of civil societies is old-fashioned; civil societies grew up as a protest, in part, against incivility and violence. Their members sought to eliminate extreme weapons and violence from daily life. The nuclear issue raises, as it has for more that half a century, the question of the threats to those civil societies. It seems to me that one of the jobs that the emerging global civil society has is to "problematize" this nuclear anarchy. And for that, I've no doubt that a rebirth of the anti-nuclear movement globally is essential.

You must change the decision-making structures if you want to make sustainable changes.

—Mikael Nordfors

Kathleen McCarthy: I find myself wondering increasingly whether NGOs are nothing but a palliative in this scenario. Are they organizations that give the impression of being able to bring about change but in reality are simply condemned to nibble at the edges of systemic problems like poverty?

Mikael Nordfors: I want to say to Franklin, Andrei, Adam, and Martin that you had problems in your countries, in my view, because you made a revolution or a major change without changing decision-making structures. The change calls for including more people, more direct democracy, more transparency. Then it doesn't matter which kind of people you put into power positions, because sooner or later they will be replaced by the same people—who may be communists in the Soviet Union, businessmen in America, or priests in other countries—the people who are thirstier for power. You must change the decision-making structures if you want to make sustainable changes.

Closing Sessions

Ira Harkavy: I would like to build on a few of the comments made by my colleagues. I think Franklin's and Jessica's comments linking democracy to issues of quality of life could not be more essential. As Ben cited yesterday: 25% of American children live in poverty; 33% or more children of color are living in poverty. In the community in which my university is located over 90% of the children are on free-lunch programs; and my university has one of the greatest health care systems in the world.

If we believe that the lived experience of people in local settings needs to improve, we need to look at the relationship of the state to institutions of civil society and markets in local settings, and then relate it to the larger constellation. The United States needs not the devolution revolution of a right wing, but a *democratic* devolution revolution, in which funds are provided to local coalitions of unions, businesses, schools, churches, hospitals, and higher education. The coalitions serve as third and fourth sectors responsible for the delivery of services. The third sector is the nonprofits, the fourth is the people of the community—families and neighbors. That strategy engages people in both third-sector relationships and neighborly face-to-face relationships, and academic-practitioner cooperation is at the center of the strategy.

What is the role of higher education? Former president of Harvard Derek Bok wrote in *Universities and the Future of America*, published in 1990, that higher education was the single most powerful institution in the United States and in advanced societies worldwide. Higher education is responsible for new discoveries, expert knowledge, leadership training, and, to be more fundamental, it shapes the schooling systems that shape democratic and non-democratic behaviors. Bok wondered why, if the U.S. has the greatest higher education in the world—which everyone says we do—why are things so bad? Why do we have economic and racial apartheid? Let me propose the following strategy: that higher-education institutions engage in academic-practitioner collaboration *in their localities*, joining forces with churches, community organizations, and schools to improve the local quality of life and simultaneously advance knowledge. I submit that this strategy needs to be implemented on a national and global level.

> *The United States needs not the devolution revolution of a right wing, but a* democratic *devolution revolution, in which funds are provided to local coalitions of unions, businesses, schools, churches, hospitals, and higher education.*
>
> —Ira Harkavy

Shibley Telhami: We discovered very quickly in yesterday's discussion that we have to infuse the term "power" into the discussion, and that has been a very obvious part of the discourse today. I suggest that we also need to infuse another term, which is "interest." We are talking about power as an instrument to accommodate interest; I think it's the interest we must be concerned about. Let me explain. The discussion today went back and forth between the descriptive and the prescriptive, between trends we can see and what we would like to see. There is a new global market that no one can escape, that has an impact on every sovereign state including the United States. It would be interesting to look at opportunities afforded by globalization that change interests, not just power, even in the powerful states. I believe that power is structured to serve particular interests. You can't affect those interests from the outside unless there is a trend toward restructuring and creating opportunities for new alliances and new structures that would lead to strategies to exploit those opportunities. The real challenge is to develop collective strategies for value-driven democratic goals.

NEXT STEPS

Hong-Myong Kim: As the idea of global civil society spreads along with globalization of market totalitarianism, it not only excludes the vast majority of the world, but also a big segment of the population within the country where it is central. We must consider these excluded populations to make our discussion viable.

> *Nonprofit institutions must be organized to fulfill the missions for which they were created, and find ways to educate their community and professional and board leadership to support legislation favorable to the sector.*
>
> —Diana Aviv

Jin Canrong: Prior to Asia's financial crisis in 1997, Chinese people felt enthusiastic about globalization. But after the crisis, they realized that economic-based globalization has both positive and negative impacts. Positive means external pressure for China's internal reforms in terms of foreign investment, management, advanced technology, marketing abroad, etc. Negative impact means a larger income gap, unbalanced development among different regions, pressure on local industry, and the deterioration of the environment.

People also know that globalization is not simply economic process—that it has complicated cultural and political implications as well. Common people mainly care about how our cultural identity will be influenced by globalization and how globalization will influence the political stability within the country. The general trend in China today is to participate in globalization. The Chinese people realize that globalization is an inevitable process, and they want to control its possible negative impacts.

Sara Melendez: In the United States some nonprofit organizations are becoming too dependent on both government and market forces. If we become too dependent on government funding, we risk becoming just an arm of government with no voice in helping to influence policy and introduce innovations. On the other hand, if we get too close to business, where is our freedom to speak out against unrestrained capitalism? The lines between the sectors are blurring constantly, and the question we are asking is: What are the lines of accountability then?

Diana Aviv: Nonprofit institutions need funding in order to be viable. If they don't get support from the public sector they turn to the private sector, primarily major donors. When those donors—often CEOs and top executives of corporations—serve on nonprofit boards, if the organization or the sector goes in a direction that is incompatible with their economic interests, they can intervene and impede the work of those organizations. I'll illustrate it with an example that's happening as we speak in the United States. The U.S. Congress, led by the Republican leadership and supported by the new president, has advocated the elimination of the estate tax. It affects 1% of the American people, and the amount of money they would get back with the repeal is something like $46 billion. We are fearful that if the estate tax is eliminated, the children of those individuals will get the money and charities will suffer. The nonprofit organizations who depend on private funding have not stood up to oppose this tax elimination because their boards are peopled by those who support the measure.

Nonprofit institutions must be organized to fulfill the missions for which they were created, and find ways to educate their community and professional and board leadership to support legislation favorable to the sector.

Barbara Shailor: The AFL-CIO put together what we're calling a long-term, multi-track campaign, the Campaign for Global Fairness. Its aim is to create sustainable, equitable, democratic development in the world and to talk with our own membership about why that kind of development around the world is necessary. We recognize that unless we can create both growth in the global economy and equitable development in the world, we can't begin to address the problems of our own American workers, such as job loss, trade deficits, outsourcing, and downsizing. Despite the fact that the American labor movement has diminished dramatically from its high point of 35% of workers two decades ago, it is still a substantial movement. It's a movement of 13 million members; when you include families, you're talking 40 million people. In political terms it was the American labor movement and workers who turned out 26% of the Democratic vote.

The Campaign for Global Fairness has a four-pronged strategy. First, we will do long-term education about globalization and why we need an equitable global economy.

Second, we will talk about securing rules for the global economy—for example, how to include worker rights in trade and investment agreements.

Third, we will talk about international solidarity as a historical imperative. The international labor movement comprises over 160 million workers. It has an infrastructure. It meets often to share strategies and comes to meetings of the World Bank and the IMF and the WTO and the ILO with common objectives. It has a substantial political voice in the world. Strengthening the capacity of the international labor movement is an ongoing objective.

Fourth, we will address the issue of corporate accountability. The ILO created the Fundamental Declaration on Rights at Work; they put together a fairly complicated document, which was adopted by all the countries in 1998. The Declaration has been made into a very simple poster, which we will ask American corporations to post in their facilities in the United States and around the world. It lays out the basic principles for workers and presents them as internationally recognized principles. We'll be joining with labor movements worldwide that will be doing the same thing. We have had discussions with German and Japanese multinationals about having the Declaration in their facilities around the world, and we hope to begin an education process to discuss rules for the global economy.

PLENARY LUNCHEON ON GOVERNANCE

Benjamin Barber: We conclude our conference with a plenary luncheon panel on questions of governance and civil society. We hope this panel will not only help sum up the work of the two Saturday sessions, but also will integrate our work over all five sessions.

Panelists for the closing session represent a cross-section of our guests from abroad and from the United States and will include: Bhiku Parekh, Mort Halperin, Ed Mortimer, Barbara Shailor, Andrei Gratchev, and Kumi Naidoo.

SUMMING UP

Morton Halperin: We must resist the temptation to argue about whether political rights are more important than economic rights; there is no incompatibility between the two. On the one hand, we cannot eliminate poverty except in democratic societies; on the other, democratic societies cannot survive unless they eliminate poverty. So the political and economic agendas must be consistent with each other.

> *We must resist the temptation to argue about whether political rights are more important than economic rights; there is no incompatibility between the two. On the one hand, we cannot eliminate poverty except in democratic societies; on the other, democratic societies cannot survive unless they eliminate poverty.*
>
> —Morton Halperin

We must, therefore, find a way to take control of existing international institutions like the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and regional and multilateral institutions in the name of democracy. They were created in very different periods and for very different purposes. During the Cold War they were frozen because otherwise they became instruments of either one side or the other of the arenas in which the battles of the Cold War were being fought. We now have an opportunity to transform them into institutions that exist for the promotion, preservation, and enhancement of democracy. That means democratizing the process in each country by which we deal with these institutions. The United States may dominate the World Bank and the IMF, but it is not the United States as a whole, but the U.S. Treasury Department. It is necessary to take that control away from Treasury if we are to democratize the process within the American government. The same is true in almost every government in the world. We must insist that those institutions adopt the democratic agenda, which means the elimination of poverty.

With the creation of a community of democracies at the end of the Cold War, we now have an opportunity to create a world movement to turn the existing international institutions into instruments for the protection of political freedom and for the elimination of poverty.

Gary Smith: There are three things that trouble me in general about this discussion. First, the effacement of differences in this discussion—the polemic against definitional differences in defining civil society, and the purported strong analogy between the South African, Polish, and Russian cases. I think there is a danger in overdrawing these analogies in the search for common strategies.

Second, I was troubled by the general assumption of the dysfunctionality of certain multilateral bank institutions, and yet very little questioning of the dysfunctionality of institutions in the civic sphere. In our work in Berlin about two years ago, to create a common initiative on migration policy and corporation strategies, it was very difficult to get the relevant academic centers and NGOs and government to work together. We finally succeeded, and it focused the discussion somewhat. For some reason, the incredible efflorescence of NGOs hasn't been matched by increasing effectiveness. We need to focus on this.

I also think we need to include the perspectives of civil society organizations or discussions in crisis areas where conflict resolution is urgent: the Middle East and the Balkans, to mention two.

Finally, I suggest we consider focusing on one issue at a time in successive forums.

Bhikhu Parekh: As we bring the meeting to a close, I would like to make three or four basic points. One is a conceptual one. What is the Democracy Collaborative promoting when it claims to be promoting democracy? Are we simply concerned with free speech and basic rights—the political infrastructure of democracy—or do we also have something much deeper in mind, the promotion of human well-being and the elimination of poverty? Democracy is not just concerned with liberal freedoms but also with two central ideas which have been at the heart of it since the time of Aristotle, namely the idea of equality and the idea of community. Take away those two ideas and there is nothing left of democracy but liberalism.

During the Cold War we said *we* were a free society and *they* were a totalitarian society. What's the difference between them and us? We have voluntary associations and they don't; they don't allow religious liberty and a host of other things. In other words, in our discussions the notion of a free society came to be equated almost entirely with voluntary associations. This understanding of civil society, in my view, constricts us and prevents us from asking important questions. I propose that we take a critical look at the concept of civil society and decide whether it's going to perform the functions we want it to perform.

Third, I question the romanticism of civil society. When I reflect on the experience of India and many of the developing societies including China, it is clear that the state has been a progressive, emancipating institution in a way that very often civil society has not been. Take the status of the Untouchables in India. Voluntary associations attempted but failed to make an impact. It took the institution of the state enacting the Constitution and declaring that all have certain rights to make the difference. Before a civil society can function you need at least two basic conditions. You need a "space of freedom" where voluntary associations can function, and you need people with civic virtues who are concerned about each other. And all that "liberal" civil society provides is spaces of freedom. It doesn't guarantee civic virtues, and it doesn't guarantee that institutions will be formed and will function. In addition, you need a fairly stable political structure, or civil society simply doesn't get off the ground.

> *Before a civil society can function you need at least two basic conditions. You need a "space of freedom" where voluntary associations can function, and you need people with civic virtues who are concerned about each other.*
>
> —Bhikhu Parekh

The next issue I want to address is globalization, because we have been talking about global civil society, global markets, and even global political institutions. I want to advance three theses. First, we have tended to discuss globalization as if it is an abstract, autonomous phenomenon confined merely to the economic realm. In fact, globalization is simply a consequence of a larger moral and cultural process that has been going on for a very long time. It includes the great European empires. Globalization recognizes a common humanity, so that if something happens to the Buddha statues in Afghanistan, we all feel concerned. There is a development of a common sense of humanity, a concern for rights, and a recognition that the earth belongs to us all. It is within the context of an emerging global consciousness that we need to locate globalization.

Otherwise we will get it completely wrong; we will see globalization only as something to be frightened about, a fear that the Americans are coming to my country to take it away. It's not like that. Globalization is a complex process with a very complex dialectic. It has a moral dimension and a cultural dimension.

Let's locate globalization within a larger context and see it not just as an economic phenomenon, but also as a political, cultural, and moral phenomenon.

—Bhikhu Parekh

Films travel, cultural ideas travel, novels travel; and, of course, goods travel, the companies travel, capital travels, people travel, immigrants travel. If it weren't for globalization I wouldn't be here, or I wouldn't be in Britain. Let's locate globalization within a larger context and see it not just as an economic phenomenon, but also as a political, cultural, and moral phenomenon.

Second, we need to recognize that globalization has advantages and disadvantages. In India, where globalization has come in a very big way, the reactions have been of the following kind. It's a good thing in that it brings in foreign capital, encourages competition, and breaks up domestic industries including television. Television in India is much better thanks to globalization than it was without it. It also brings benefits to consumers because goods are cheaper. But it also has profound disadvantages. It increases inequality; it creates a footloose class of technocrats whose interests are linked to international corporations outside and not with locals. Therefore, it destroys what you and I would call a political community. When you feel that your way of life is increasingly being destabilized, it creates cultural panic—and fundamentalism.

Globalization has a tendency to weaken democracy, not just in the receiving countries but more important or equally important, in the United States and other metropolitan countries. Once corporations take the lead in globalization, they insist that their government force other governments to create certain conditions for globalization, and democracy at home begins to suffer. This is the experience one learned during the imperial expansion. Not only were liberties destroyed in the countries that were the object of the expansion, but they were destroyed at home as well.

And here is my final thesis, which I think is absolutely crucial. As a parliamentarian and as someone who during the last eight or nine months has specialized in Britain in globalization, international trade, and international justice, I have been asking myself: What kinds of institutional structures are needed to get the maximum advantage of globalization, while at the same time regulating it? Without some kind of regulation of currency transactions and currency speculation, no international justice is possible. We need political structures of global governance. The United Nations must be radically reformed so that it doesn't merely represent nation-states, but also NGOs. As long as it represents only nations or states, NGOs have no say.

We need to think in imaginative terms. I propose, as an example, that if you want to create a global civil society, why not create a global income tax? Several economists have been considering the following two strategies, and I have done some work in this area. If, for example, income tax in all of the advanced countries were to be increased by one-tenth of one percent it would generate something like $28 billion available for international distribution. Suppose, too, that progressive-minded people were to say: We would like to help, but we don't want to give to charities; we want our money to be properly chan-

neled. Suppose that every month one percent or one-half of one percent of our salaries taken away—through voluntary transactions by the tax department—to be distributed for certain services such as countering AIDS, or malaria, or other things in other parts of the world. Economists who did the work for me tell me that even if between 5% and 10% of the people were to volunteer to do this kind of thing all over the world, not just in advanced countries, it would generate something like £36 billion. Imagine the capacity that gives us to tackle great international problems, including epidemics of all kinds!

I believe that in the context of a global public the tax concept is critically important. Because all ideas, if they are going to be implemented, need a social battle. You need a global public to mount and pilot ideas through. Is there a global public? I think one is beginning to emerge. We have seen it in the case of South Africa and the pharmaceutical companies; we have seen it in the case of the Taliban and the Buddha statues. We need some kind of global, international public, sharing common ideals, like the Kyoto treaty, to put pressure on the United States. An international public is beginning to emerge, but it is not yet fully effective because it has no institutional articulation. In order to checkmate corporations you need international trade unions. Likewise, we need international academic associations, meetings of universities the world over, meetings of journalists, meetings of young people, meetings of indigenous peoples, consumers, etc. If we thought in terms of setting up international forums at multiple levels, then we would gradually begin to see a crisscrossing international global public that would be there to carry some of these ideas through.

Andrei Gratchev: During these two-and-a-half days we managed to create a kind of molecule, maybe a cell, of what we are trying to define as global civil society. Since the experience has been successful, let us try to analyze the conditions that led to this success. First, you gathered a group of people who were free from prejudice, including racial prejudice. We are also free of ideological fundamentalism, though people present at this table have different convictions. Because people brought to the table different experiences, we were interesting to each other. We also gathered around a certain concrete and precise goal that actually led to a common effort, which seems also to be a prerequisite for success. I think it was important that, because all of us felt free from suspicion, we could not be in any way co-opted by any kind of power. Add to this a little bit of art and a certain Ben Barber, and you have a very successful mixture.

> *[T]he difference between imperialism and universalism...is that universalism requires rules that apply to all, including potential or actual imperialists.*
>
> —Edward Mortimer

These conditions are not unique. There are across the world thousands of groups and NGOs and collectives—democratic or otherwise—gathering around a variety of subjects. The specificity of our group, I think, was that it was staged. You brought together a highly heterogeneous and, at the same time, a highly representative group, which means that it can be reproduced elsewhere. The ease with which we came to understand each other (though not necessarily to agree with each other) proves that the time for such a gathering has come.

Regarding technology, we could move ahead in two interesting directions. First, we could continue to get together and contribute to building a global public—a necessary agent and a necessary subject of global civil society. And second, we can continue the process of liberating the international agenda.

Gary Smith suggested that the debate we've had during these two-and-a-half days could produce topics for a series of future meetings. I suggest we address the topic of the democratization of international relations, because it could lead us in the long run to building what could become the legal and organizational structure of a new and emerging world order.

We need to accept the inevitability of the political and economic strength and power of concentrated capital, and we need to analyze the monolith and find entry points where we can promote the interest of the G-8 and at the same time promote our own interests and move the global community forward.

—Franklin Sonn

Edward Mortimer: According to Ambassador Sonn, universalists are really just imperialists in sheeps' clothing. That challenging observation has made me think about what is the difference between imperialism and universalism. My answer is that universalism requires rules that apply to all, including potential or actual imperialists. One message we should take from this meeting is the importance of advocating universalism within the single superpower. If our American colleagues can convince their compatriots and their government that it is in the interest of all to have a system of laws and rules that are obeyed by the most powerful as well as by the weak, we will be better off and closer to a functioning global society. My second observation is that vibrant civil society is absolutely essential, but it can only work within the framework of law.

Third, democracy is necessarily, in a society of more than a few hundred people, representative. Therefore, it's very important that the activists who make up civil society and who, I believe, are mostly genuinely attached to the democratic ideal, should think about ways of strengthening representative institutions—making them more alive, more legitimate, and more useful.

Fourth, I think that legitimizing global institutions is desirable. Nobody is going to give a lot of power to a global bureaucracy in the foreseeable future. We are condemned to find ways of getting states to work together. Therefore, we must go back to the representative institutions, to civil society functioning within states, and making those states work better to provide the framework at both the national and global levels.

As for topics for our future discussions, the environment is a very important aspect of the future global order. It really determines whether there will be one or not. Also, let's bring in more voices. There are some geographical areas of the world that are either un-represented or underrepresented here, South Asia for one.

Miklos Marschall: For me, this wonderful discussion boils down to two very simple questions. First, is the civil society phenomenon just the product of our post-Cold War, post-bipolar world, or is there is something more to it? My enthusiastic answer is yes, there is much more to it than that. My second question is: Are we are better off having this myriad of NGOs and civil society organizations? Are we better off than 10 years ago or 15 years ago? Again, I believe that we are much better off by having these many civil society organizations. Because of that, I propose that at our second round of talks, in Berlin, we should spend more time on the very nature of these organizations. I would like to see more focused discussion about who we are, what mandate we have, to whom we are accountable, and how we operate.

I would also add that it was wonderful to have some excellent artists with us; I would encourage you to invite even more artists to our conversation in Berlin, musicians and painters, because it was really one of the highlights of this meeting to hear from them about civil society.

Benjamin Barber: South Africa has been marked by a remarkable set of individuals who have a particular spirit that inspired not only the resistance to apartheid but also the creation—under the most difficult circumstances—of a fledgling democracy. I can't imagine that our meeting would have been anywhere near as successful as it has been if we had not had one of those most courageous spirits with us in Franklin Sonn.

Franklin Sonn: I will relate the South African experience to how I believe we should move forward. I agree with Bhiku that we are dealing with power relations in the global community and that those power relations are skewed. How do we move forward, given that reality of skewed power relations? We need to accept the inevitability of the political and economic strength and power of concentrated capital, and we need to analyze the monolith and find entry points where we can promote the interest of the G-8 and at the same time promote our own interests and move the global community forward.

How was it possible in South Africa for Mandela to step forward and say to de Klerk, "Let's talk capitulation"? First was the destruction of the Berlin Wall, which created a special environment in which he could talk. Second, he found out exactly what the interests of de Klerk and his people were and played to those interests rather than threatening them.

When we next meet, we should find ways and means of promoting this strategy. We, for example, found that the U.S. is weak when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation. And my tiny country, South Africa, was strong as far as that's concerned because of Mandela's influence in the non-aligned nations. And, so, Clinton begged Mandela to get the United Nations, through the non-aligned movement, to agree to the indeterminate extension of the non-proliferation treaty. I suggest that at our next meeting we deal with these things in a practical way, because if we find and identify those entry points, we can build strength.

Benjamin Barber: I think it's clear that we want more civil society and more of what goes with it. But we also recognize that civil society itself is not a muscular enough tool to achieve our democratic goals. We cannot depend on the instrumentalities and institutions of civil society either inside a nation or globally to create a framework within which civil society can be powerful. Civil society needs friends, allies, and muscle—which it must get, ultimately, from progressive democratic states—along with acknowledgement from the economic sector. On the whole, only democratic, progressive states have the muscle to make civil society real, and there's got to be a powerful alliance there.

The ultimate problem for civil society comes back to a political issue. Can we have genuinely democratic states? One of the great books of recent times is Amaratya Sen's book, *Development as Freedom*, in which he says very clearly, "Wherever you see famine and natural disaster, you will see no democracy." In real democracies, there's never poverty or famine or natural disasters. Though some disasters are seen as natural, they're not. They're the result of how we distribute power and resources. People may all be a little bit hungry; there may be tough years and good years, but, in fact, democracy is the response to poverty. Democracy is the response to famine, AIDS, and ignorance. The economic param-

eters globally constrain democracy nation-by-nation. It's not easy for South Africa or for Poland or India to be fully democratic in a global market society where these forces are not particularly interested in democracy and may, indeed, even make democracy difficult.

And I want to say to our friends outside the U.S. that that's not good enough. It's true that there is an elephant in your front parlor—the United States, by way of its global economic institutions. But that's not a good enough reason to say you can't be sufficiently democratic. The struggle has to happen nation-by-nation. Sometimes I think that the power of the United States can be a convenient excuse. We'd like to be democratic but we can't, because America and its global institutions are simply too much in the way. Democracy is always a struggle. It was a struggle in the 17th century when Englishmen looked at a monarch and a church that were all-powerful. Who would have thought they could have wrested democracy from that in the 18th and 19th centuries? Imagine if you were an African American slave in 1830 or 1840. You wondered: How can we ever be free? How can that struggle succeed? If you were a woman at the beginning of the 20th century in America, you had no vote. You might have said: How can we ever achieve that? But it was achieved through political struggle. I very much agree with the people in this room who have said over and over again that though civil society and its freedom and its arts and its education and religion are our goal, it is only through democratic political struggle, nation-by-nation, within the U.S. and within all nations, that we will all be free. Only through such struggle are we likely to achieve the toughness and muscle to force civil society through and make it the primary counterbalance to the state and the economic sector.

> *[T]hough civil society and its freedom and its arts and its education and religion are our goal, it is only through democratic political struggle, nation-by-nation, within the U.S. and within all nations, that we will all be free.*
>
> —Benjamin Barber

Bhikhu Parekh: Ben, on behalf of all my colleagues here, thank you once again for giving us not only a wonderful exchange of ideas, but also a wonderful deepening of our sensibilities. It was splendid.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Benjamin Barber: I want to thank those who made it possible for us to have a smooth and productive conference. No organization or event functions well unless it has people who plan, implement, and coordinate the many substantive and formal aspects of it. I am grateful to Kevin Greene, a graduate student at the University of Maryland, for his help in the final planning stages of the Roundtable; to Jennifer Gano of the Walt Whitman Center, who has spent many months working on the logistics of the Roundtable; to Jane Rostov, Executive Assistant to Sondra Myers, for her fastidious attention to all the details; and to Sondra Myers, Roundtable Coordinator, for her oversight of the entire project.

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The Theory and Practice of Civic Globalism
A Program of the Democracy Collaborative
April 19-21, 2001
Washington, D.C.

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